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FINLAND AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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FINLAND AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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FINLAND AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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FINLAND AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

AMERICAN INTEREST.

Finland's war against Russia, even if Finnish military activity were confined to the defense of what she now holds, would still constitute a possible source of friction between the United States and the Soviet Union, which might seriously prejudice the success of the joint effort of these two powers against Germany. Finland's withdrawal from actual hostilities, even though it were not accompanied by the withdrawal of German forces from Finland, would to a large extent remove that source of friction and at the same time weaken German attacks on Russia in the far north.

If cessation of active support of German military activity by Finland led to the voluntary withdrawal of German forces from Finland, the war effort of the United Nations would be benefited in two ways: 1) by the removal of a major threat to the land section of the Northern Supply Route from Great Britain and the United States to the Russo-German front (the relative importance of this route has increased, as Japanese successes have reduced the value of the Eastern and Southern supply routes to Russia);

and 2) by enabling Russia to concentrate all her forces in the West on a shorter front.

If, on the other hand, Germany refused to withdraw her forces, and Finland, prepared by a skillfully conducted campaign of propaganda and supported by Anglo-American forces in the far north, broke with Germany and hostilities resulted, the advantages to America and the other United Nations would be even greater:

1) Politically, this would be a step toward Scandinavian unity, with advantages to the United Nations;
2) Psychologically, it would have a beneficial effect on public opinion in the United Nations, and the opposite effect in Germany;
3) Strategically, it would open large possibilities for the United Nations to turn Germany's northern flank and for interrupting Germany's communications in the Baltic, particularly her iron ore supply route from northern Sweden.

FINLAND'S WAR AIMS.

Two of Finland's war aims--successful resistance to the Russian attack and redemption of the territory lost as a result of the Winter War with Russia--have already

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been achieved. The third aim--defeat of Russia--which the Finns expected to be a matter of only a few weeks, has not been accomplished. The available evidence indicates that up to the launching of the Russian counter-offensive early in December and the entrance of the United States into the war, the Finnish governmental and military leaders planned to annex East (Soviet) Karelia in order to secure a more defensible frontier (Gulf of Finland--Lake Ladoga--Lake Onega--White Sea--base of Kola Peninsula), and that once having secured this frontier they planned to stand on the defensive. The Finnish Government refrained from making a public announcement of its intention because of the opposition of the Social Democrats to anything that smacked of imperialism and also because of reluctance to run the risk of a complete break with the United States. The failure of the Finnish army to complete the occupation of East Karelia appears to be due to unwillingness to incur the losses of men which this operation would entail, to domestic criticism of the East Karelian adventure, to growing war-weariness, to the success of the Russian counter-offensive against the Germans, to Swedish disapproval, and to reluctance to cause a break with the United States. While future German successes against the Russians might change the whole picture, the evidence available to date indicates that the annexation of East Karelia, while it may be hoped for ultimately, has been given up for the present and is not now a major war aim of Finland.

THE SUPPLY SITUATION.

The grave shortage of foodstuffs is the chief reason for the growing war-weariness in Finland; it also assures to Germany--today the sole source of imported food--a very strong lever for keeping Finland in the war. Even in peace-time, Finland is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. As a result of the Winter War, the country lost 10 per cent of her arable land with a less than proportionate loss of consumers. This loss, plus the poor harvest of 1940 (yields of cereals, fodder, roots and hay were 20 to 50 per cent below average), made necessary the introduction of drastic measures in the period between the end of the Winter War and the beginning of the present conflict. In spite of these measures, it was necessary to reduce the bread ration 25 per cent, to an average of 2,000 grams per person per week, on June 1, 1941--almost a month before the outbreak of the second war with Russia.

The present war has reduced Finland's food supply in two ways: by taking man-power from the farms, it has caused a reduction in the domestic crop, while at the same time the opportunities for importing have been drastically reduced. While Sweden sent considerable amounts of food to Finland during the first months of the present war, the increasingly vigorous restrictions on her overseas trade, the large proportion of her own man-power under arms, and the possibility of a German attack, have combined to reduce Swedish food exports to Finland to a slender trickle and have made it unlikely that Finland can count on Sweden for any significant help in the future.

Finland is almost entirely dependent on Germany to make up her growing deficiencies in foodstuffs. Germany has shipped significant quantities of bread grain and has promised more, but deliveries have been late (due in part to the freezing of the Baltic ports) and while Germany can probably supply Finland with enough grain to maintain the present rations (and possibly even improve them slightly), it seems clear that the amount of such supplies will depend on the degree of military cooperation which Finland will grant.

Some measure of the seriousness of the food situation is provided by the daily calorie consumption per capita, as estimated in November, 1941: normal consumer--1800 calories (as compared to 2300-2700 in peace-time), heavy worker--2,200 calories (3,000-3,600 in peace-time). The situation as regards home-produced food is likely to deteriorate further in view of the fact that, due to labor shortage, only one-half of the fall plowing was completed last autumn and there is little hope that the discrepancy can be made up this spring.

The available evidence strongly suggests that unless Finland can import substantially greater foodstuffs--primarily grain--than she has been able to secure in the recent past, she will be confronted with a food supply problem of very serious proportions which, in the case of the poorer elements of the urban population, may approach the dimensions of starvation. By her ability to withhold the bread-grains which Finland must import, Germany is in a position to exercise the strongest kind of pressure on both the external and the internal policies of Finland.

TRANSPORT PROBLEMS

Transport problems which face all the belligerents are especially acute in Finland. The length of the front, the lack of local provisions in most of the front-line area and the necessity for frequent replacement of German troops serving in the far north have placed an extraordinary burden on internal transport. The shortage of rolling stock, due to losses in the Winter War, and the necessity of operating the captured railways with Finnish material has been ameliorated only slightly by the importation of freight cars from Estonia and Latvia. Requisitioning of motor transport by the military, shortage of gasoline, and difficulties in regard to spare parts have helped to make it impossible to meet even essential civilian transport needs. Transport difficulties explain in part the food shortages in the cities.

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CASUALTIES.

Casualties up to the end of November 1941 approximated the losses of the Winter War, i.e., 25-30,000 combatant deaths and approximately 60,000 wounded, including 6,000 permanent cripples. These losses help to explain the reluctance of the Finnish command to undertake further major offensives.

WAR-WEARINESS.

As long as the Finnish people believed that the war would soon be over, with their arch enemy Russia beaten to her knees and unable to threaten the independence of Finland for many years, the heavy casualties and the severe food shortages were generally regarded as the necessary price to be paid for ultimate security. But with the stalling of the German offensive and the assumption of the attack by Russia, and above all, with the entrance of the United States into the war on the side of Russia, evidences of war-weariness have multiplied. Desertions from the army have increased to the point where it has been necessary to make the punishment for that offense less severe. It is significant that a report that no further military activity need be expected caused wild rejoicing when it reached one section of the front.

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INFLUENCE OF SWEDEN.

Sweden exercises a peculiarly potent influence in Finland due to the close cultural ties of the two countries, their common fear and distrust of Russia, and Sweden's very considerable aid to Finland during the Winter War and the early months of the present Russo-Finnish War. So long as Finland's announced war aims were merely resistance to Soviet attack and the recapture of the areas lost as a result of the Winter War, Swedish opinion was solidly behind the Finns, even though many Swedes were apprehensive over the advance of Germany on their eastern flank. But when it became apparent that Finland aimed also at the conquest of East Karelia, liberal and left-wing opinion in Sweden became increasingly critical. Dagens Nyheter, the largest Swedish paper, on February 10 warned Finland that Finnish aspirations regarding East Karelia must result in a modification of Sweden's understanding of Finland's struggle as one for freedom and peace. However, Sir Stafford Cripps' unfortunate speech at Bristol on February 8, in which he supported Soviet domination of eastern Europe after the war, brought Swedish criticism of Finnish policy to an abrupt stop. Sweden would welcome an end to the Russo-

Finnish war and the reestablishment of the boundaries of 1939, but she cannot be expected to take a lead in mediating between the two contestants, since to do so would give Germany an additional excuse for increasing the pressure on Sweden itself.

INFLUENCE OF GERMANY.

Germany's influence on Finland is compounded of political, economic and military factors. Whatever the momentary views of individuals and parties in Finland have been toward Germany, the geopolitical situation of Finland has compelled its government to regard Germany, regardless of its form of government, as a counterweight to Russia. While Finland, under acute German pressure, has signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, she has not yet, so far as is known, acceded to German pressure for a clear-cut political alliance.

From the evidence available, it appears that Germany's military influence on Finland has declined in considerable measure since last fall and that for several months her principal means of bringing pressure to bear on Finland is the threat of withholding food supplies. The effectiveness of this threat is in some degree, at least, offset by Germany's failure to deliver all the supplies promised at the dates agreed on. Irritation toward Germany is increasing, due to this and to the conduct of German soldiers in Finland. A suspicion that Germany may abandon

Finland is current, at least in some circles. In general, it may be said that Germany's hold on Finland has weakened since last fall; and although it is still considerable, it could be still further weakened by a properly organized propaganda campaign.

INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

Until our entry into the war on the side of Russia, the influence of the United States on Finnish public opinion was greater than that of any other country with the possible exception of Sweden. A tradition of friendship and understanding as deep as that which has existed between Finland and the United States is not easily wiped out, though the developments of the present world conflict have placed the United States on the side of Finland's enemy and Finland on the side of the enemies of the United States. Although the Finnish Government rejected American requests that Finland refrain from occupying East Karelia, there is evidence that uneasiness and chagrin were created by our view that the Finnish-Russian War is definitely a part of the larger conflict and by our failure to accept the Finnish interpretation of "strategic boundaries." Although the controlled Finnish press has attacked the United States and played up the successes of Japan, the

Finnish Government has thus far resisted German pressure for the closing of the American Legation in Helsinki and for an advance on Sorokka to cut one of the major supply routes to Russia. The reluctance of the Finnish Government to antagonize the United States suggests that a more intensive campaign to present American views on the world conflict would be favorably received in Finland.

EVIDENCES OF DISUNITY.

The failure to secure peace by a quick victory over Russia, the heavy casualties, the severe food shortage, the mounting resentment toward the Germans, and a growing conviction that their war with Russia is not an isolated struggle, but part of a world war in which the Finns find themselves in the unhappy position of fighting on the same side with the deadly enemies of the democratic life which they cherish--all these factors have undermined the monolithic unity which was so apparent in the Winter War. It would be incorrect to assume, however, that the dissatisfaction with the present government of Finland is such as is likely to lead to its replacement in the immediate future by a regime more amenable to American desires. On the other hand, it appears likely that the existing area of discontent could be enlarged by a

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carefully organized propaganda campaign which took due account of Finnish sensibilities. 1/

CONCLUSIONS.

The evidence available, much of it inconclusive and some of it self-contradictory, suggests that Finland's situation has deteriorated to such an extent that she is no longer a free agent. Though she has regained the territory lost to Russia in the Winter War and though her soldiers are deep in enemy territory, there is a growing realization among the Finns that they are more or less helpless bystanders, that the fate of their country will be decided, not by their own efforts, but by the outcome of the titanic struggle into which they have been unwillingly drawn. Under the circumstances, and with allowances for the stubborn Finnish nature, it is likely that the decisions of Finland's leaders will depend on their estimates of the outcome of this struggle. If Germany is successful during the coming summer, Finland will probably continue her war with Russia as a more or less inactive

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1/ It cannot be too greatly emphasized that, in any attempt to lessen public support of the present policies of the Finnish Government by radio propaganda, the greatest care would have to be exercised not to offend Finnish sensibilities. No approach should be adopted without the most painstaking consideration of its probable effect. The advice and suggestions of the American representatives in Finland, who are in the best position to know what to stress and what to avoid, should be scrupulously followed.

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belligerent and may even possibly undertake offensive action. If, on the other hand, Russian resistance is strong enough to stop a German offensive in the east, or if the United Nations are successful in establishing a second front elsewhere in Europe, Finland might be receptive to renewed suggestions that she withdraw from the war, especially if these suggestions are preceded and accompanied by a carefully conducted propaganda campaign, or better yet, if through Anglo-American military operations in northern Scandinavia, Finland could obtain food for her starving people and a reasonable degree of assurance that her independence within the 1939 frontiers will be respected. If, as seems probable, Finland's withdrawal from the war with Russia resulted in hostilities between Finland and Germany, the situation could be exploited with great political, psychological, and strategic advantage to the United Nations.

J. A. Morrison

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FINLAND AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR

I. INTRODUCTION--AMERICA'S INTEREST

Will Finland conclude a separate peace with Russia?

Athough the Finnish Government in its long-delayed reply of November 12 to the Memoranda delivered by the American Legation in Helsinki, October 27 and 30, seemed to answer this question in the negative, the Russian successes of recent months and a distinctly less confident tone in Helsinki suggest that the Helsinki Government may shortly find it necessary to reconsider its position. It is the purpose of this memorandum to evaluate the evidence available to this office which bears on this question and to present certain tentative conclusions.

The interest of the United States in a positive answer to this question is obvious. In the first place, because of its geographical position, so long as Finland is involved in war against the Soviet Union as an ally of Germany, the security of the Northern Supply Route to the Russo-German front is menaced. The threat from Finland is especially acute as regards the port of Murmansk and its railway connections with the interior. The importance to the United States of this route, described in a report of the East-European Section, C.O.I. ("Supply Routes from the United States to the Russo-German War Zone," Dec. 22, 1941), obviously has increased since December 7. The United States as an ally of Russia cannot afford a Russian defeat through lack of materiel. At the same time Japanese successes have reduced the value of the Eastern and Southern Supply Routes, increasing the relative importance of the Northern Route.

In the second place, it is to our interest that Russia be able to concentrate against Germany all her forces in Europe. So long as Finland is at war with Russia, Russian forces which otherwise might have a favorable effect on the course of the war with Germany, are held in the north.

In the third place, the continuation of Finland, long the darling of American public opinion, as an ally of our principal enemy while we fight on the side of Finland's enemy, confuses the basic issues of the war in the minds of many Americans and prepares fertile ground for Axis propaganda. This situation, coupled with urgent demands for added American supplies for the Pacific and a widespread dislike and distrust of the Soviet regime might conceivably effect adversely the delivery of the supplies promised to Russia. Furthermore, in view of the long-standing popular and official sympathy for Finland in this country, there is the possibility that if Finland continues in the war against Russia, friction between the United States and Russia may develop which may seriously prejudice the success of the joint effort against Germany.

These vital interests of the United States justify every possible effort to persuade Finland to withdraw from the war.

That such efforts have not been successful to date, is due not to the lack of any diplomatic skill on the part of our responsible officials, but to the tragic situation in which Finland finds itself and a certain degree of blind hatred toward Russia on the part of most Finns which makes a realistic approach to the problem almost, if not quite impossible for them.

However, the Russian counter-offensive against Germany, the entrance of the United States into the war, and increasing evidence of war-weariness and privation in Finland offer some hope that Finland may yet withdraw from actual hostilities. To reach any reasonably correct conclusion as to the likelihood of this development, it is necessary to examine the available evidence--cablegrams and despatches from the American legation in Helsinki, intercepts, press dispatches and the like--with a view to estimating the degree of achievement of Finland's war aims, the reactions to peace "feelers," the extent of food shortages, military casualties, disagreement among political leaders, the degree of dependence on Germany, and other factors. And even then, the conclusion must be tentative in character.

II. THE WAR AIMS OF FINLAND. What are they and to what degree have they been satisfied?

A clear and definite statement of Finland's war aims is difficult, if not impossible, for the same reason that a precise statement of the war aims of England or the United States is difficult. Finland, like the two ~~last-named,~~ is a democratic state; consequently, although the government of the day may have rather definite ideas as to the goals toward which the martial efforts of the country should be directed, they must be so stated as to be acceptable to the majority of the people. This necessity does not always make for clarity and preciseness of statement. The task of the analyst is not made easier by the fact that the present government of Finland is a national one: that is, it represents a coalition of the principal parties of rather different philosophies, whose leaders may, and frequently do, express different opinions as regards foreign policy even in time of war.

There can be no doubt that all Finns were united in the desire to resist and turn back the Russian attack of June 25, 1941. There can also be little doubt that all Finns were also united in a common desire to regain the territory taken from them by Russia as a result of the Winter War of 1939-1940. Unquestionably, the people of Finland are also practically unanimous in their desire for secure freedom under their own institutions, and it may safely be assumed that a large majority of the Finnish people are convinced that such security can best be achieved through the defeat of Russia, the country that they believe to be the only real threat to that security. These, then, are the war aims on which the nation is agreed. Two of these aims--successful resistance to the Russian attack and the redemption of the territory lost as a result of the Winter War-- have already been achieved.

During the first five months of the present conflict the Finns, in common with many other people, believed that the defeat of Russia and the end of the Russian threat to Finland's security was a matter of weeks only. But Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim, perhaps more familiar than his compatriots with Russia's historic ability to "come back," believed in implementing this security by the occupation of East or Soviet Karelia in order to obtain a more defensible frontier, and in his Second Order of the Day of July 11 he announced this as a basic war aim of Finland.

The East Karelian question is the rock that may split the unity of Finland. To the military mind of Baron Mannerheim the matter of a defensible frontier naturally seems paramount. The Winter War demonstrated the impossibility of defending the 1000 km. long land frontier of 1939. If East Karelia were annexed, the land frontier with Russia would be reduced to the narrow Karelian Isthmus, the somewhat wider isthmus between Lakes Ladoga and Onega, the 200-km. stretch from the north end of Lake Onega to the White Sea--with much of that composed of small lakes and rivers, and the 200-km. stretch across the base of the Kola Peninsula (assuming that Finland did not acquire the entire peninsula) from the head of the Gulf of Kandalaksha to the head of the Kola Fjord, nearly half of which is covered by Lake Imandra. Both President Ryti and Foreign Minister Witting admitted privately that neither had been informed in advance of Baron Mannerheim's intention to proclaim the annexation of Soviet Karelia as a Finnish war aim, and both Ryti and Witting sought at one time to make it clear that this war aim was not necessarily that of the Government, but neither publicly repudiated the Field Marshal's assertion of policy. 1/ In fact, Witting subsequently informed the French Minister that a "strategic frontier along the White Sea and Lake Ladoga" was an essential Finnish war aim. In a speech at Vasa on September 14, Tanner,2/ the Social Democratic Minister of Commerce, remarked that "our long boundary with Russia is not yet safe, and it may be necessary militarily to secure areas beyond," while the conservatives and the right wing press clamored for incorporation of East Karelia with Finland. 3/

1/ Memorandum on the Second Russo-Finnish War, by Robert McClintock, Secretary of the American Legation, Helsinki, October 31, 1941, p. 49. Confidential. This excellent document should be consulted by those desiring a detailed account of the origins and early months of the present Russo-Finnish conflict.

2/ Ibid., 56. See also telegram #400 (September 3, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Ibid., 63.

However, many in Tanner's own party viewed an extension of Finnish rule over Soviet Karelia with considerable apprehension. As early as July 13, the organ of the Social Democrats, Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, recalling that East Karelia had never belonged to Finland, hoped that "the Field Marshal intended by his Order of the Day merely to declare that this region should be liberated from Soviet rule in order to enjoy complete self-determination with regard to its future status." 1/ And following Mannerheim's July 11 Second Order of the Day, the Swedish Military Attache remarked that the declared policy of taking over East Karelia would make Swedish cooperation difficult, as now Finland clearly was not fighting a defensive war. 2/ This early evidence of Swedish disapproval of the conquest of East Karelia is significant, for Swedish support had previously been whole-hearted, if not entirely official.

A story reported in a press dispatch from Stockholm on November 23, 1941 (and stated to have come from "a source close to the Finnish General staff") indicates that in the Finnish army itself, even when the German and Finnish forces were still advancing, there was opposition to the conquest of East Karelia. According to this report, two Finnish

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1/ Ibid., 49.

2/ Ibid., 50. See also telegram #275 (July 7, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Secret.
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battalions on the Salla front refused to fight, on the ground that while willing to fight in defense of their country they would not advance into Russian territory. The same troops, according to the report, fought well when sent to the Hango front. 1/

That the Finnish Government itself has never officially and openly proclaimed the annexation of East Karelia as a war aim is probably in part due to the protest of the Government of the United States. So long as Finland's war aims were confined to the reconquest of the territories ceded to Russia under the terms of the Peace of Moscow, the vital interests of the United States were not seriously affected. But when, following the reconquest of these territories, Finnish forces continued their advance into East Karelia in the direction of Lake Onega and the White Sea, and when at the same time there was strong evidence that the conquest of East Karelia was a war aim of the Finnish Government, Finland began to threaten directly a policy adopted by the United States--the policy of supplying war materials to Russia. For the seizure of East Karelia meant the severing of the Murman Railway--a vital link in one of the Northern Supply Routes to Russia.

Although President Ryti was very bitter when presented with the American aide-memoire of October 3 warning Finland against a further advance into Soviet territory, he contented

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1/ New York Times, November 24, 1941, by telephone from Stockholm, November 23, 1941.

himself with a defense of the Finnish occupation as of "a purely military character" and let it be inferred that it might be temporary. Justifying the Finnish action, the President claimed that 98 per cent of the inhabitants of the districts occupied by Finnish troops were persons of Finnish race. 1/ When warned of an "instant crisis" in Finnish-American relations if the Northern Supply Route to Russia were "subject to interruption by attack based even allegedly or presumably on Finnish territory" (American Memorandum of October 27), Ryti, although denying "with great passion" that Finland was a vassal of Germany ~~the United States~~ and insisting that Finland would pursue her own ends, nevertheless did not specify that the annexation of East Karelia was one of those ends. In the lengthy answer (November 11) to the American memorandum of October 27, the Finnish Government referred to the occupation of Soviet territory east of the boundary of 1939 as a "transferring of defense" into areas from which Finland had been attacked, and justified this advance with a detailed description of the various branch railways leading west from the Murmansk Railway, and of Soviet highways and airfields, discovered

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1/ These areas were included in the territory that Russia offered to Finland in exchange for territory on the Karelian Isthmus, during the negotiations preceding the outbreak of the Winter War. Incidentally, if Finland intended to occupy only those districts in East Karelia where the population is predominately of Karelian (Finnish) race, the Finnish troops should have stopped considerably short of their present line.

by the Finnish occupying forces. These facilities were presented as evidence of aggressive Soviet intentions (though similar works on the Finnish side of the frontier were apparently not considered evidence of like intentions on the part of Finland). The nearest this memorandum came to announcing outright annexation was when it stated that "there is cause to keep the areas in question occupied by Finnish troops." 1/

That the government did not publicly proclaim the annexation of East Karelia as a war aim of Finland may be due in part to a reluctance to give grounds for a break with the United States; but it may be attributed in part also to the attitude of the Finnish Social Democrats. As early as November 4, Pekkala, the Social Democratic Minister of Finance (who had recently returned from a trip to Central Finland where he found almost everybody excepting the more prosperous elements war-weary and ready to end the fight forthwith) intimated that many of his party disagreed with the government's policy and proposed to exercise pressure on it to end hostilities. 2/

1/ Telegram #572 (November 12, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. (Text of Finnish Memorandum of November 11)

2/ It was Pekkala, supported perhaps by Fagerholm, the Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs, who insisted that the answer to the Memorandum of the United States be toned down.

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However, there is some reason to believe that the government planned first to occupy and later to annex all of East Karelia. Early in November the Finnish General Staff informed the American Legation that the Finnish forces would advance to the line Petroskoi (Petrozavodsk) - Sorokka (Belomorsk) - Kandalaksha - Kola fjord; in other words would occupy practically all of East Karelia. 1/ On November 27, Schoenfeld reported that the head of the important government-controlled cellulose company, Enso-Gutzeit, had been making investigations in East Karelia for a month. 2/ On the 29th Mannerheim proclaimed to the nation that there was "not much farther to go before we have achieved our strategic goal, namely, to seize from the enemy those means which he has carefully prepared to destroy us and to establish a border which it is easier to defend than any earlier Finnish border." 3/ Plain talk and clear. Even plainer were the remarks reported to have been made by Premier Rangell to a secret session of the Diet: "Our security can be achieved only by territorial means. ... The only hope for us is in moving the frontiers eastward. The only way to solve the

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1/ Telegram #564 (November 7, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. According to the General Staff informant, the Finnish army would not conquer the Kola peninsula, "but would not reject it if offered."

2/ Telegram #610 (November 27, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Washington Evening Star, November 30, 1941., A.P. from Helsinki.

problem of East Karelia is to keep it occupied by Finnish troops." 1/

According to Mannerheim's close friend Prof. Vaino Tanner (the geographer, not the Minister of Commerce), the Government deliberately fostered the association of Mannerheim's name with the program for the annexation of East Karelia. According to this informant, the Marshal's pronouncements were used as a trial balloon. When it became clear that such a program was disapproved abroad and was not genuinely popular in Finland, the Government attempted to dissociate itself from it. 2/

From the foregoing it seems reasonably clear that up to the launching of the great Russian counter-offensive early in December and the entrance of the United States into the war a few days later, the Finnish Government planned to annex Soviet Karelia, but refrained from making public formal announcement of its intention because of the opposition of the Social Democrats to anything that smacked of imperialism and also because of a reluctance to run the risk of a complete break with the United States.

1/ *New York Times*, November 30. U.P. from Helsinki. But it must be noted that the remarks of Mannerheim could, if necessary, be disowned as not representing the views of the government, while Rangell's speech could also be repudiated.

2/ Telegram #198 (March 11, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

Since the beginning of the new year, the Finns apparently have had increasing doubts as to their ability to take all of East Karelia. By the beginning of 1942 they had reached a line running along the Svir River from Lake Ladoga to Lake Onega and thence north to Seesjärvi (Segozero). But in a conversation with the United States Military Attaché, the intelligence officer of the Finnish 11th Division expressed grave doubts as to whether the Finns would undertake any further offensives. 1/ In his resumé of public opinion for the two-weeks ending January 4, the American Minister noted that while on New Year's Day the Speaker of the Diet and General Mannerheim exhorted steadfastness, the people were becoming "increasingly averse to Mannerheim's chauvinism, and with the troops, see no reason for keeping men (sorely needed at home) way off in Russian Karelia." 2/ On January 3, the important Suomen Sosialidemokraatti published an editorial in which it was stated that "there are probably certain possibilities of dropping military operations." 3/ This was the first time since the beginning of hostilities that a Finnish paper had dared to suggest the possibility of a de facto armistice. Continuing, the editorial pointed out: "There are reasons to remind us that it was only in self-

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1/ Telegram #723 (January 1, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #15 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ New York Times, January 5, 1942, by telephone from Stockholm, January 4.

defense that we were drawn into the second war. Finland's policy has never been and must never be a policy of imperialistic aggression." Recalling Mannerheim's November Order of the Day in which he said there was not much left to accomplish before Finland would fulfill her strategic aims, the editorial pointed out that "since this Order of the Day, further important points have been occupied by our troops which would make it appear as if strategical aims had already been fulfilled." Three days later a press dispatch from Stockholm reported recurring rumors that Finnish military aides several weeks previously had advised Mannerheim to refrain from further advances into Soviet territory. 1/ The following day it was reported, also from Stockholm, that a majority of the Finnish government were reported to feel that Finland had achieved her strategic aims. 2/ The same day in Helsinki an official spokesman, while denying the "widespread rumors" that Finland was ready to withdraw from the war, said it was impossible to make a pronouncement on the correctness of the views expressed in the Suomen Sosialidemokraatti editorial referred to above. He also admitted that the army had not recently engaged in offensive operations. 3/ In his resume of public opinion for the period

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1/ Washington Post, January 7, A.P. from Stockholm, January 6, 1942.

2/ New York Times, January 8, U.P. from Stockholm, January 7, 1942.

3/ New York Herald Tribune, January 8, 1942, A.P. from Helsinki, January 7, 1942.

January 5-19, Schoenfeld reported considerable confusion in the public mind as to just what Finland was fighting for. Conclusive proof of instances of mass desertion and mutiny at the front was also reported to exist. 1/

As the Germans continued to fall back during January before the Russian counter-offensive, there began to be signs of real nervousness in Helsinki. On the 21st Schoenfeld reported that Mannerheim was worried and had said in private that success for the Nazi spring offensive was anything but assured. 2/ That the Field Marshal was no longer sure of conquering East Karelia is suggested by a message from Schoenfeld the following day (January 22), in which the American Minister, reporting on information received by our military attache from the General Staff, concludes that "the Finnish command apparently does not contemplate a further offensive in the Sorokka region, at least not in the near future." 3/

1/ Telegram #67 (January 24, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #61 (January 21, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #63 (January 22, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. However, in a telegram two days later, the American Minister reports that according to "other well informed sources, including a high Foreign Office official", a joint Finno-German offensive against Sorokka (Belomorsk) is imminent in order to eliminate Murmansk as a supply base. These sources cite the arrival of numerous German supply ships and fresh Nazi troops at Abo, the curtailment of railway service, and the recall of men recently released from the army. (No. 68, January 24, 1942, Secret). A subsequent telegram (No. 87, February 1, 1942, Secret) confirms the arrival of more German troops in Finland and the imminence of an attack on Sorokka, but states that the Finns will not participate. A similar view was later expressed by the French Military Attache, (No.

Subsequently an officer from the Finnish GHQ told a member of the American Legation staff that the Finns could easily take Sorokka by moving north from Poventsa (Povenets) and Karhumaki Medvezhya Gora ~~(?)~~, but that Mannerheim has deliberately refrained. The same officer also said that the reported bombings of the Murmansk railway refered only to the section south of Sorokka and that the Finns had deliberately refrained from attacks on the Murmansk-Sorokka-Archangel line. 1/

On January 30, the rector of the Academy of Social Sciences in Helsinki, then a captain at General Headquarters, told a member of the American Legation staff that anxiety was spreading among prominent politicians and even high staff officers as to Finland's fate. Inquiring as to the possibility of mediation by the United States, he expressed the view that if a peace were underwritten by Britain and the United States, Finland would be satisfied with the 1939 boundaries. 2/ This may indicate that Finnish G.H.Q. was not unanimous in demanding the conquest of Eastern Karelia before making peace.

90, February 3, 1942). He also reported that the Finns were entrenching along the Svir and constructing "fortifications of a permanent nature on the isthmus between Lake Onega and Seesjarvi (Segozero)"--suggesting that the Finns planned to hold this part of Eastern Karelia.

1/ Telegram #85 (January 31, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. This is confirmed in a subsequent telegram from Schoenfeld (No. 113, February 12, 1942. Secret).

2/ Telegram #86 (January 31, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

In his speech of February 3, at the opening of the new session of the Diet, President Ryti made no reference to East Karelia and the need for strategic frontiers, and while charging that "Bolshevism remains the greatest danger threatening us and all Europe," he confined his remarks on war aims to generalities about security for small nations. 1/

In sharp contradiction to the trend of reports since the first of the year, which indicate increasing doubts as to the ability of the Finnish army to take the rest of Karelia up to the White Sea, is the view expressed to Minister Schoenfeld early in February by the Associated Press representative in Helsinki, Sjoblom. According to this observer, the Finns were getting ready for a campaign in March which would be pushed through to the White Sea. Sjoblom reported high

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1/ Telegram #92 (February 4, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Plain. According to the American Minister in Stockholm: "Well informed and responsible persons in the Swedish capital do not regard Ryti's speech as a decision by Finland to stake everything on an Axis victory or as presaging further attacks together with the Germans against the Russians. These circles regard Ryti's statements as those of the chief of a belligerent state compelled to praise an ally fighting the common enemy and to proclaim his country's intention of prosecuting the war to a victorious conclusion. They feel that Ryti's failure to mention a possible offensive toward the White Sea or any other military goal in Russia is especially significant." (Telegram from Johnson, Stockholm, February 19, 1942, #310. Secret).

enthusiasm among the 18 and 19-year old soldiers who were being trained for this campaign in special shock units. 1/ The reliability of this witness is, however, held in considerable doubt by a member of the East-European Section, C.O.I., who has known him personally and considers him naive and poorly informed, "full of romantic notions about the land of his ancestors and likely to entertain extreme Finnish nationalist views." Sjoblom has been a contributor to several Finnish-language newspapers in this country.

Swedish journalists who recently visited Finland on an official tour report considerable disagreement in Finland regarding East Karelia. The representative of Dagens Nyhter writes that many civilian Finns consider the East Karelia program too ambitious for a small state and doubt that even a successful summer campaign could settle Karelia's fate. The chief editor of Nya Dagligt Allehanda reports that the goal of security in the east unites all Finns, but that there are differences on how to achieve it, with a seemingly equal division of opinion as to whether East Karelia should be taken over or not. 2/ That in spite of this lack of unity in

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1/ Telegram #105 (February 7, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #238 (February 9, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Plain.

regard to East Karelia, the government apparently still considered the annexation of that region, is indicated by the fact that the Foreign Minister presented each of the visiting Swedish journalists with a copy of Professor Jaakkola's recent book, Finland's Eastern Problem, which justifies large territorial expansion at the expense of Russia. 1/ Tanner, however, in a speech in Helsinki on March 13--the second anniversary of the Peace of Moscow--hedged somewhat: "For the present we have reason to limit ourselves to the statement that these new areas are only militarily occupied and that their fate will be decided later." 2/

The domestic criticism of the East Karelian adventure, growing war-weariness, the continuing success of the Russian counter-offensive against the Germans, Swedish disapproval, and reluctance to cause a break with the United States, all help to explain the failure of the Finnish army to complete the occupation of East Karelia. For several months now the Russo-Finnish front has remained static with the Finns established on the line Svir River - Lake Onega. To complete the conquest of East Karelia would necessitate an advance to

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1/ Telegram #129 (February 17) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. A subsequent telegram (#164, March 2, 1942) from Schoenfeld reports that Witting "appears to have gone over to the expansionists who contend for a strategic water frontier running from the White Sea to the Gulf of Finland through Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga."

2/ Telegram #213 (March 14, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

the White Sea. This would cut the vital supply route Murmansk - Sorokka (Belomorsk) - Obozerskaia (Archangel R.R.). Since this is now the chief supply route to Russia from England and the United States (due to the closing of Archangelsk by unusually severe ice conditions), it is not surprising that the Nazis have exerted all possible pressure on the Finns to advance. On February 11 Schoenfeld reported that according to the French Military Attaché, whose information had hitherto proven reliable, the Nazis had urged the Finns to attack, but without success. 1/ This source was of the opinion that the Finns would not risk the sacrifice of another 20,000 men which the capture of Sorokka would entail and that they would hold their present positions or possibly even get out of the war.

A further factor which may account for the reluctance of the army to advance further and which may help explain the vagueness of the government regarding East Karelia is the attitude of the East Karelians themselves, who apparently are not at all enthusiastic over the prospects of Finnish rule. According to Toivola, son of the Counselor of the Finnish Legation in Washington and an officer in a ski

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1/ Telegram #106 (February 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. In refusing to advance on Sorokka, the Finns could point out that the Nazis had not made an all-out effort to capture Leningrad even when they had it surrounded. It has been suggested by one very well qualified observer, formerly a member of the American Legation staff in Helsinki, that the failure of the Germans to seize Leningrad was due to a suspicion on their part that once this city was taken, Finland would have no interest in continuing the war.

battalion, the east Karelians are not at all the noble Finns of the Kalevala, yearning to be free, but the toughest enemies the Finns have encountered.[1]

While German successes against the Russians might change the whole picture, the evidence available to date indicates that the annexation of East Karelia, while it may be hoped for ultimately, has been given up for the present and is not now a major war aim of Finland.

III. THE SUPPLY SITUATION.

The grave shortage of foodstuffs is the chief reason for the growing war-weariness in Finland; it also provides Germany with a very strong lever for keeping Finland in the war.

Even in peace-time, Finland is not self-sufficient in foodstuffs. In the immediate pre-war period (1935-1938) Finland depended on imports to cover 20 per cent of her bread grain requirements, 1 per cent of her potato consumption, 5 per cent of her requirements of edible fats, and 90 per cent of her sugar needs. Her export of some 15,000 tons of butter annually was more than offset by imports of vegetable oils. A small export of meat and meat products (3 per cent in excess of her average annual consumption in the period 1935-1938) was battalion, the east Karelians are not at all the noble Finns of the Kalevala, yearning to be free, but the toughest enemies the Finns have encountered.[1]

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[1] Telegram #140 (February 21, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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1/ Telegram #140 (February 21, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

possible only because of a considerable import of feedstuffs--an average of 75,000 tons of maize and 8,000 tons of oilcake for the period under review. 1/ To pay for these imports of foodstuffs, Finland must export--primarily lumber and wood products which constituted over 80 per cent of the value of her exports in 1938. The outbreak of war in September, 1939, by reducing her foreign trade, put Finland on short rations. The Winter War rapidly exhausted such stocks as existed, while transportation difficulties and financial problems hindered their replenishment. As a result of the harsh terms of the Treaty of Moscow, Finland lost 10 per cent of her arable area, 10.5 per cent of her bread grain production, 12 per cent of her potato production, and two sugar factories.2/ This loss in food-producing capacity was not balanced by a proportional loss of consumers, since practically the entire population, numbering 440,000 people of the ceded areas migrated to regions under the Finnish flag, placing an additional heavy burden on the food-producing capacity of these areas. The food problem was still further aggravated by the poor harvest of 1940 (the yields of cereals, fodder, roots and hay were 20 to 50 per cent below average) due to the severity of the preceding winter and drouth during the summer following,

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1/ British Ministry of Economic Warfare, Summary of Enemy Economic Developments (hereafter referred to as M.E.W., S.E.E.D.), #100, August 13, 1941.

2/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #100, August 13, 1941.

thus increasing the dependence on imports at a time when these were less available due to poor yields in neighboring countries and to the increasing severity of the blockade which reduced the possibilities of securing supplies from overseas. 1/

In an attempt to alleviate the shortage of food which thus developed in the period between the Winter War and the present conflict, the Government inaugurated a number of drastic measures. To make up in part, at least, for the loss of arable land, a comprehensive plan was drawn up for the clearing of about 65,000 hectares of forest land and the plowing of some 40,000 hectares of meadow land. However, this program was not expected to provide immediate relief. 2/ Reconstruction and enlargement of the port facilities of Liinahamari (Petsamo) and improvement of the Arctic Highway were undertaken to provide a route for the importation of overseas supplies (and also the export of Finnish and Swedish commodities) less subject to interference from the belligerent powers. New compensation and clearing agreements with neighboring countries were arranged and export controls strengthened. The development of substitutes was fostered. Of the various

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1/ Ibid.

2/ Report on "European Food Situation and Agricultural Prospects" from Josef Rosenwasser, Schweiz Wirtschaftsarchiv, Basle, to Dr. Helen C. Farnsworth, Food Research Institute, Stanford University. (Based on clippings from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, National Zeitung [Essen] and Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) measures undertaken the drastic rationing of a great variety of commodities, promised the most immediate results. 1/

The effectiveness of these various measures was offset to a considerable degree, however, by peasant hoarding of grain, by the private purchase of unrationed food by German soldiers, and by the failure of the import program (the supplies of grain which the U.S.S.R. had agreed to send were only in part delivered). 2/ In view of subsequent efforts to restrict "black market" operations, it may also be presumed that illegal trading helped to nullify the government's measures.

On June 1, almost a month before the outbreak of the second war with Russia, it was necessary to reduce the bread ration by 25 per cent to an average of 2,000 grams per person per week; the diet of the "normal" consumer reached the low level of about 1,700 calories per day. 3/

Finland's economic structure was in no condition for another war, certainly not for one of more than a few week's duration. Had the war lasted only the month or six weeks that many expected, the country might have withstood the strain, but the struggle has now dragged on for nine months and a victorious peace seems very remote. Meanwhile economic conditions have deteriorated catastrophically.

1/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret; International Reference Service, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Vol. I, No. 27 (June, 1941), "Economic Conditions in Finland in 1940," p. 3.

2/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #100, August 13, 1941.

3/ Ibid.

The present war has reduced Finland's food supply in two ways: by taking man-power from the farms it has caused a reduction in the domestic crop, while at the same time the opportunities for importing have been drastically restricted. While the Winter War was an "off-season" war, insofar as agriculture was concerned--mobilization did not take place until the harvest was completed and hostilities ceased well before the spring planting--the war which started last June 25 has kept men from their fields at critical seasons. It was bad enough for the men to be away at the time of the July hay harvest, but it was much more serious when the time of the major harvest came with the men still at the front. "In their absence, old men, women and children have had to harvest the crops as best they could, to thresh them, to sow the seed to provide next year's bread, and to plow the land; each of these a task which normally far surpasses their frail powers." 1/ According to the Finnish Minister to Stockholm, 16 per cent of the country's population has been mobilized (including the women in the auxiliary services). In his opinion the only remedy for the economic situation, which he characterized as "appalling," was the immediate return of the members of the armed forces to pro-

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1/ American Legation, Helsinki, Quarterly Economic Report - Finland. July 1-September 30, 1942, pp. 1-2.

ductive labor. 1/ In this connection the French Military Attache reported on November 9, 1941, that the Finns told Major Engel, Hitler's personal aide-de-camp, that Finland had mobilized, in proportion to its population, four times as many men as Germany and warned that re-establishment of agricultural and industrial productivity was impossible while all these men remained in the army. Further confirmation of the acute labor shortage is contained in the Economic Intelligence Notes of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare for the week ending February 27; according to this report (not confirmed from Helsinki), Finnish children over 15 years of age have been conscripted for labor and may not be evacuated to Sweden. The same report states that Danes and Swedes are going to Finland to relieve the labor shortage. 2/

As though shortage of labor were not a sufficient handicap, unfavorable weather conditions have helped to make a bad situation worse. A dry summer followed by rain at the end of August and in early September, which hampered the harvest, resulted in a cereal yield of 147 thousand tons less than the average for the years 1926-1930--instead of 60,000 more than

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1/ Telegram #103 (January 19, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. An earlier report (M.E.W., S.E.E.D. #115, November 26, 1941), states that out of the total population of 3,800,000, 400,000 men and 200,000 women, or 15.8 per cent of the total, were serving in the armed forces.

2/ Telegram #1052 (March 5, 1942) from Matthews, London. Secret.

the 1940 harvest, which early crop estimates had indicated.1/ The shortage of farm labor and an early winter also affected the potato crop adversely. "Farmers and their hands were so overworked in September [due to the absence of so many men at the front] that they simply could not find the time to take up potatoes, although the price fixed for sale in September was higher than that for October."2/ The potato problem was still further aggravated in the cities by difficulties of transport, which are discussed in a subsequent section.

The decline of domestically produced foodstuffs would normally be met by increased imports from abroad, primarily from overseas. Until the British declaration of war on Finland, it was still possible, under the navicert system, for Finland to carry on a certain amount of trade with the Americas, although her loss of shipping was severe. But with Great Britain formally at war with her, Finland's foreign trade is restricted to Sweden and the axis-dominated area in Europe. Neither the one nor the other can supply Finland with all the food she needs.

Sweden is more nearly self-sufficient, as regards foodstuffs, than Finland and is still able to carry on a certain

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1/ *Ibid.*; telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. 1941 crop yields in millions of kilograms: wheat-169.4, rye-272, barley-146, oats-549, mixed grain-10.8, legumes-17.7, potatoes-807, roots-500, field hay-1911.

2/ *Quarterly Economic Report*, etc., p. 25.

amount of trade with overseas countries. However, this trade is carefully regulated by the British and no navicerts will be issued for a shipment which is suspected of being destined for Finland or intended to replace an equivalent shipment from Sweden to Finland. In spite of the difficulties involved, and although it has meant the lowering of her own reserves, Sweden has nevertheless sent notable quantities of foodstuffs to Finland - both before and since the present conflict began. According to a report of December 29, 1941, Sweden by that date had sent to Finland since the beginning of 1940: 60,000 metric tons of wheat and flour, 5,760 tons of butter and other edible fats, and 6,000 tons of sugar and syrup; of these quantities 7,200 tons of wheat and flour, 1,600 tons of butter and other edible fats, and 1,000 tons of sugar and syrup were delivered before the beginning of the present Russo-Finnish conflict. 1/

Since the normal trade between Finland and Sweden is heavily in favor of the latter (even before the Winter War Sweden extended a credit of 100 million kronor to Finland), Finnish imports from Sweden have been possible only because

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1/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D. #119, December 29, 1941. In July of last year Sweden undertook to supply Finland with 5,000 tons of wheat and rye flour, 1,500 tons of tinned meat, 1,300 tons of butter, 500-1,000 tons of potatoes, 500 tons of peas, 300 tons of lard, 1,000 tons of syrup and molasses, and 10 tons of chocolate (M.E.W., S.E.E.D. #97, July 23, 1941). It is not known to what extent these supplies were actually delivered, or whether, if delivered, they are included in the deliveries given above.

of Swedish credits of various kinds. During the Winter War Finland received a state credit from Sweden of 200 million kronor, in addition to gifts totaling approximately 150 million kronor. During the 14 months, September 1, 1940 - October 31, 1941 (the period of the first commercial agreement concluded after the Moscow Peace), Swedish exports to Finland were estimated at over 100 million kronor, while Finnish exports to Sweden hardly exceeded 25 million kronor. In order to meet this situation, Sweden granted export credit guarantees in the amount of about 25 million kronor, and the Swedish government granted two financial credits, one of 30 million kronor, and another of 20 million.1/

There is, however, a limit to this kind of one-sided trade. Sweden is already dangerously over-extended in her credits to Germany. Unfortunately, Finland's chief exports - forest products - are also Sweden's chief exports, in peace-time at least. Normally Finland can export, however, some commodities that Sweden would like to buy, i.e., nickel from Petsamo, copper from Outokumpu, sulphur pyrite from the Outokumpu ore, metallurgical charcoal and wood fuel. But Germany has a mortgage on the first three, and

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1/ Quarterly Economic Report - Finland, etc., pp. 39-40.

charcoal and wood fuel cannot now be supplied by Finland, due to the shortage of labor. Thus, if Finland is to obtain additional supplies of food from Sweden, it will be necessary to obtain still further credits. These Sweden is apparently unwilling to grant; negotiations over a further extension of the trade agreement broke down because Sweden, while willing to prolong the credit of 100 million kronor due this year, was unwilling to accept the overdraft clearing system that the Finns demanded. As the Swedish Ostersundsposten (Conservative) pointed out, the state that grants credits must be allowed to stipulate the terms.[1] Although Sweden is unwilling to again extend the trade agreement with Finland, she has made it possible for Finland to obtain from Denmark certain supplies during the first half of 1942--Germany willing--to be paid for through the Swedish-Danish clearing account in Stockholm. Under this arrangement Denmark is to export to Finland 1900 tons of butter, 5000 hogs, and an equivalent quantity of pressed meat. 2/

It is difficult to believe, however, that even were it possible to reach an agreement regarding the financing of trade, a continuation of food imports from Sweden on as

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1/ Telegram #496 (March 11, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Secret.

2/ Telegram #142 (January 26, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Plain.

substantial a scale as formerly would be possible. With restrictions on her overseas trade becoming ever more rigorous, with a large part of her own man-power under arms, and faced with the possibility of a German attack, Sweden cannot afford to release a great deal more of her slender food supplies to her neighbor across the Gulf of Bothnia. Furthermore, Sweden's 1941 crop was the lowest in 50 years. 1/ Toward the end of February the Finnish Associate Minister of Supply went to Stockholm in the hope of at least obtaining some grain, but was unsuccessful. 2/ It is thus unlikely that in the future Finland can count on Sweden for any significant help in the matter of foodstuffs.

There remains Germany and the part of Europe controlled from Berlin. It is not necessary to demonstrate that German dominated Europe is not a region of food surpluses. On the other hand, it is also clear that Germany does not hesitate to starve the conquered peoples if their food is needed by the Germans or their allies. Of the minor European states associated with Germany in the war with Russia, Finland is the only one that Germany does not now dominate by military

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1/ Quarterly Economic Report, etc. 22.

2/ Telegram #176 (March 6, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

force. Yet Finland's position, threatening both the sea and land portions of the chief supply route to Russia, makes it imperative for Germany to keep Finland in the war. The promise of food is one of Germany's two chief clubs. The other is the threat of outright military control by Germany.

According to *Dienst Aus Deutschland* for November 24, 1941, the first agreement for providing Finland with bread grain from Germany assigned to Finland 125,000 metric tons, of which 50,000 tons were said to have been already delivered. The same source further stated that additional shipments amounting to 75,000 tons had been agreed on, making a total of 200,000 tons promised by Germany.[1] The shipment of 50,000 tons is confirmed by the *Quarterly Economic Report-Finland* cited earlier, which states that up to November 19, 1941, 50,000 tons of rye had been sent from Germany to Finland (p. 22).[2] Although the Germans agreed on November 14 to ship an additional 75,000 tons, they subsequently made delivery of grain allocated to Finland, contingent on Finland's signing the Anti-Comintern Pact by November 25, the fifth anniversary of that accord. 1/ Following the signing of the pact, a part, at least, of the promised grain appears to have been delivered, for on January 9, 1942, the Associate Minister of Supply, Ramsay, stated in a press interview that Germany had provided Finland with "the greatest help" in regard to food supplies, and on the 20th of the same month, Witting assured the American Minister that food supplies "until the next harvest now seem assured." 2/ In any case an increase in bread and sugar rations was announced on the 21st, and on the following day the influential *Uusi Suomi* stated editorially that thanks for the larger rations were especially due to Germany. 3/

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[1] "German Grain Exports to Finland," by Sam E. Woods, Commercial Attaché, American Embassy, Berlin, completed November 28, 1941. (Embassy #3388; State Department #28662; C.O.I. Accession #7995)

[2] The same figure is given in M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #116, December 3, 1941. One half of this grain was delivered at the end of August and early in September, making it possible to maintain bread rations during September (*Quarterly Economic Report-Finland*, p. 24; also M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #105, September 17, 1941).

On February 3 negotiations for a new German-Finnish trade treaty were initiated in Helsinki, and on the 14th an agreement was announced with much fanfare and many expressions of mutual good will. Although apparently no official figures were published as to the volume of goods and supplies to be exchanged (Schnurre, the head of the German delegation stated that negotiations regarding details would be undertaken toward

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1/ It is not clear whether the grain which was held up until Finnish adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact was the remainder of the 125,000 tons originally promised or the additional 75,000 tons over and above the 125,000 tons.

2/ Telegrams #25 (January 9, 1942) and #57 (January 20, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #64 (January 22, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Plain. M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #124, January 30, 1942, indicated that the bread ration had been increased 305 grams a week (in terms of flour) due to the arrival of rye shipments from Germany.

"the middle of the year"), British circles believe that the Germans promised Finland a monthly allocation of 20,000 tons of bread grain and 1,000 tons of butter, during the next six months. 1/ These amounts, according to the British, while not sufficient to permit any substantial increase in the Finnish rations, should prevent such deterioration in the food situation as might seriously affect Finland's will and power to remain a combatant. Government spokesmen and the press hailed this agreement as the solution of Finland's most serious problem.

On the basis of the new agreement and the 75,000 tons of rye promised earlier, the bread ration for February was increased by about one-fifth. But this relief was to be short-lived; before the end of the month several vessels supposedly loaded with grain were ice-bound in German Baltic ports.

In addition to the grain shipped or enroute from Germany, some food supplies have reached Finland from Denmark (in addition to those arranged for under the Danish-Swedish clearing account). Previous to October 1st, the Danes shipped 15,000 tons of sugar to Finland. 2/ Arrangements were also

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1/ Telegram #972 (February 28, 1942) from Matthews, London. Secret. (Transmitting information provided by the Ministry of Economic Warfare.)

2/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #107, October 1, 1941.

made to ship 3.6 million eggs from Denmark to Finland. 1/ Last fall Helsinki and other large towns were said to rely entirely on Denmark for their egg supplies. 2/

It is hazardous to predict how long and how completely the Germans can carry out the terms of the new trade agreement. Their failure to realize any significant food gain in the occupied parts of Russia, and the fact that the seizures in the occupied countries of the west have probably reached by this time the point of diminishing returns, suggest that the Axis food reserves are running low. The reductions in German food rations announced for April 6 may indicate a growing seriousness of the food situation in Axis Europe. It is, however, possible, although not likely, that these reductions are being introduced in order to make available the food promised to Finland. It can be argued that if the German High Command is planning an offensive in Russia this spring or summer, it would seek by every means to keep Finland--so important as a base for cutting the northern supply route to Russia--in the war as long as possible. On the other hand, in view of the danger that reduction of the food rations in Germany, coming on top of the losses suffered

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1/ Neue Zuercher Zeitung, October 30, 1941.

2/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #108, October 8, 1941.

in the Russian winter campaign, may lower the morale on the home front to such a level as to seriously endanger the success of the coming offensive, it seems unlikely that the reduction of rations in Germany has been ordered merely to aid Finland, vital as it is to keep Finland going. In any case, Germany's ability to feed the Finns, or its incapacity to do so, may prove decisive in the future development of both the external and internal policies of Finland. 1/

Conspicuous, and in some cases, serious shortages of foodstuffs have been evident in Finland from the beginning of the present conflict--indeed shortages have been chronic since the beginning of the Winter War. The Quarterly Economic Report, referred to earlier, noted some stringency in the bread supply as early as last September. But the first serious shortage was in the potato supply in Helsinki and other consumption centers, also in September. No more old potatoes were available, and because of the shortage of labor and transport, new potatoes were not reaching the markets. As a result, it was almost impossible to purchase potatoes for a period of several weeks. Since the poorer elements of the city population depended on potatoes for their chief basic nourishment, the situation was serious indeed, especially in view of the fact that these elements

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1/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

of the population were the least whole-hearted in their support of the Government. As a result of special measures by the Ministry of Supply--a decree compelling farmers to sell a specified quantity of potatoes per hectare, and the use of municipal busses for transporting the new crop to town--the shortage was overcome for the time being.1/ That this relief was short-lived is suggested by a report in January that most of some 9,000 tons of German potatoes purchased by the municipality of Helsinki arrived frozen.2/

The poor grain harvest in 1940 and the difficulty of obtaining adequate supplies of cereals from the trade area to which Finland has access, necessitated a stringent rationing of bread even before the outbreak of the present Russo-Finnish war. In March, 1941, bread was rationed as follows:

1. Children born in 1934 and after - 6 kilos per month.
2. Persons doing light work, housewives, etc., - 7.5 kilos per month.
3. Persons doing heavy work - 13.5 kilos per month.
4. Persons doing very heavy work - 18-20 kilos per month.

By October it had become necessary to reduce the allowance of the second category from 7.5 kilos to 6 kilos, of the third from 13.5 to 9.1 kilos, and of the fourth from 18-20 kilos to 12.8 kilos. An additional category, persons doing medium heavy work, was introduced, with a per capita allowance of

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1/ *Quarterly Economic Report*, 24-25.

2/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

7.5 kilos. Information available in this office does not indicate that any further cuts have been made since last October, in spite of reduced grain reserves. 1/

By Mid-November the grain shortage was so acute that Hitler's threat to deny Finland the 75,000 tons of rye promised earlier was sufficient to secure Finland's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, even though it was recognized that such close association with Germany would have an adverse effect on relations with the United States and Britain.2/ The desperate nature of the bread grain shortage was revealed in all its starkness by the action of the Finnish government when the promised German grain shipments were held up by ice in German ports. On receipt of this news, the Government ordered the confiscation of all the seed rye and half the seed wheat previously reserved for the fall sowing of 1942 in the southern and

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1/ A British report of the end of last December indicated that further reduction in the bread allowance was out of the question, as it was already so low. (M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #119, December 29, 1941)

2/ Telegram #603, (November 22, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. At that time the grain deficiency (presumably for the period up to the harvest of 1942) was estimated at 150,000 tons.

central parts of the country, and also the grain the farmers had been saving for consumption in August, 1942. It was announced that the confiscated grain would be replaced by grain from the German ships when they arrived.1/ However, there was a grim suspicion that the German grain, when used as seed, would not mature so far north.2/

The confiscation of seed grain is generally resorted to, only when actual starvation threatens. In this case it also shows how desperately Finland depends on Germany, for apparently Finnish stocks were so low that the few days of delay in shipments from Germany were enough almost to exhaust the existing supplies. 3/

The situation as regards edible fats is equally serious. As has been pointed out earlier, Finland in peace time was an important butter-exporting country, but it more than made up for this export surplus by imports of vegetable oils. It might be supposed that the reduction or cessation of vegetable oil imports would not materially have changed the over-all fat situation, since the former exportable surplus

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1/ Telegram #162 (February 28, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #175 (March 6, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ In February the American Military Attache visited the recaptured port of Hango and reported that bread was so scarce there that flour was being made from grain that the Russians had soaked in gasoline, but had failed to ignite before withdrawing. (Telegram #153 (February 26, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.)

of butter would replace the margarine made from imported vegetable oils. However, since the Finnish dairy-man depended on imported maize and oil-cake to supplement the domestic meadow grass and hay, his inability to obtain the essential imported feedstuffs has necessarily led to a decline in butter production. Undoubtedly the shortage of grain for feeding has also contributed to a decline in output.1/

Fats were rationed even before the outbreak of the present Russo-Finnish war. In March, 1941, the ration allotment for a person doing light work was 175 grams per week. This ration remained in force through October, but in November the weekly allowance for a person doing light work was reduced to 140 grams a week (one-half butter and one-half other fats), which was only one-half the pre-war consumption. 2/ In December it was necessary to reduce the allowance drastically; the ration for a "normal consumer" being cut to only 37 grams per week. 3/

1/ It is also possible that there was some butter export after the Winter War. In June, 1941, a consultant for the East-European Section, C.O.I., was told by a former member of the Finnish diplomatic service who had left Helsinki in May, that 30,000 tons of butter were exported to Germany in the spring of 1941 to pay for armaments ordered from that country. If true, this would help to explain the subsequent shortage of fats.

2/ Food Rationing in Finland, confidential report by Lewis W. Gleeck, American Vice Consul, Helsinki, completed November 8, 1941. (Department of State #28534; C.O.I. Accession #7760)

3/ Information to Agriculture and Standard of Living Section, Economics Division, C.O.I., from British Embassy, Washington, January 10, 1942.

A report in a Swiss newspaper indicated that it might even be necessary to eliminate the fat ration entirely for others than sick persons and children. 1/ However, it was apparently not necessary to take such a drastic step; in late December or early January 2,000 tons of butter were received from Germany, making it possible to increase the butter allowance for January. 2/

The almost complete cessation of the import of feedstuffs and the sharp reduction in grain production since the outbreak of war in 1939 have seriously affected the livestock situation. According to information contained in an intercepted letter, the number of head of livestock has decreased 20 per cent since 1939. 3/ While shortage of fodder may lead to a temporary increase in the supply of meat as farmers slaughter the livestock they are unable to feed, such an increase can hardly fail to be followed by a sharp drop in the available supplies. Apparently the stringency had already

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1/ *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, December 10, 1941.

2/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. This report states that allowance was raised to 300 grams, but it is not clear whether this was for the entire month or for only a part of the month.

3/ Letter from Valtameri Osakeyhtio, Helsinki, to Armour and Company, Chicago, August 3, 1941. (Trinidad Intercept, #5846, C.O.I. Accession No. 1947) An article in *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, January 1, 1942, states that livestock have been "decimated" by the poor harvests and lack of fodder imports.

set in by the beginning of the present conflict: the Quarterly Economic Report notes that by November, 1941, meat had been practically unavailable in the towns "for months," although supposedly rationed. In that month meat purchases were theoretically limited to 18 Finmarks worth per month (about one-half kilogram, at the prices fixed at that time). This represents a decrease of approximately 80% from the average consumption per capita in 1938. 1/ In December it was the official view that meat would be even scarcer in the spring, making it necessary to cut the value of the food coupons. 2/

Fish, ordinarily an important article of diet among the poorer classes, have also been scarce. On the occasion of the Helsinki annual herring market of the Aland fishermen (October 27), only a fraction of the usual supply was offered for sale. The mining of fishing areas, the conscription of fishermen for war duties and the deficiency of fuel to take the boats to and from the fishing grounds combined to reduce the catch. 3/

The sugar situation in Finland is less serious than that

1/ Food Rationing in Finland, etc.

2/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #117, December 10, 1941.

3/ Food Rationing in Finland, etc.

with respect to most other foodstuffs. Although Finland is dependent on imports for 90 per cent of her peace-time sugar requirements, these supplies come principally from parts of Europe now dominated by Germany. Hence, sugar imports can be maintained, insofar as access to the normal sources is concerned. The low ration allowance before the outbreak of the present conflict--750 grams per person per month in March, 1941, (less than one-third of the consumption before the Winter War)--was probably due to the necessity for importing other supplies that were more urgently needed. Since then, the allowance has been increased on at least two occasions--to 1,000 grams in October, and to 1,250 grams in November (approximately one-half the pre-war consumption).1/ It was possible to maintain this allowance through January.2/

Eggs, which may be substituted for meat on the ration cards, are even less available than meat. Although in the last pre-war year Finland exported 140 million, Finnish cities are now reported to rely entirely on Denmark for egg supplies. 3/ However, these imports were sufficient to provide a ration allowance of only 6 eggs per month in November, 1941. 4/

1/ Food Rationing in Finland, etc.

2/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #108, October 8, 1941.

4/ Food Rationing in Finland. The same allowance held in December, according to Neue Zuercher Zeitung of December 10, 1941.

The milk supply, as of December, 1941, was officially stated to have fallen off 50 per cent since 1939. 1/ This is presumably due to the shortage of feedstuffs; however it is possible that the farmers are converting larger amounts than usual into cheese which they are holding for the future. In November, 1941, the milk allowance was on the average 28 per cent below the 1938 per capita consumption. 2/

Although coffee does not belong to the category of essential foods, the shortage of this commodity is a serious deprivation to a people as fond of this beverage as are the Finns. The blockade has almost completely cut off any coffee importations. In December, 1941, the ration cards allowed the purchase of one-quarter of a kilogram for the entire month--but this was the last allotment. Since then coffee has been unobtainable except for minute quantities purchased at extremely high prices on the "black market."

The effect of the reduced rations on the nourishment of the people can be judged from the daily calorie consumption per capita as estimated in November, 1941. At that time the "normal consumer" (person doing light work) averaged a daily consumption of only 1800 calories compared with

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1/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #118, December 17, 1941.

2/ Food Rationing in Finland, etc.

2300-2700 calories in peace-time; a heavy worker had on the average a consumption of 2200 calories, compared to 3000-3600 before the war.[1] Newspaper articles and radio broadcasts describe the situation in all its grimness. On December 22 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti admitted "that direct starvation is threatening Finnish cities," while other Finnish newspapers mentioned "disastrous undernourishment" and said that rations had reached their minimum limit. On December 29 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti appealed to Sweden for food, hinting that Swedish negligence in helping the starving Finns would give ammunition to those who would like to see a rift between the two countries. 2/ On the 31st an official English-language broadcast from Stockholm referred to the dreadful predicament of Finnish children, victims of malnutrition and disease. The next day the same station reported that "infant mortality is now very high, amounting to four times the normal figure." A telephoned dispatch from Stockholm in the New York Times of January 11 referred to "absolutely horrifying pictures" by Swedish correspondents of the food situation in Helsinki and other Finnish cities. According to this report, the food problem had become so serious that it had even "superseded the frightening prospect of fighting--virtually alone--another defensive Winter War against the Russians."

1/ M.E.W., S.E.E.D., #119, December 29, 1941.

2/ Telegrams #719 and 721 (December 29, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

The confiscation of seed grain is not the only warranty of an even darker future; according to an official in the Ministry of Supply, the acreage plowed last fall was only 60 per cent of that in the fall of 1940, which itself was below normal; according to another report, only one-half of the fall plowing was completed last autumn. 1/ Nor is there much hope that the discrepancy can be made up by extra spring plowing, since, according to the same Finnish official, there is little likelihood of soldiers being especially furloughed for the spring plowing and even those released for the winter--70,000, according to the Finnish Minister in Stockholm--may be recalled before spring work begins.2/ Admitting that the lack of nourishment was already severe, the informant remarked that the people still did not appreciate the full gravity of the food situation.

The available evidence strongly suggests that unless Finland can import substantially greater foodstuffs--primarily grain--than she has been able to secure in the recent past, she will be confronted with a food supply problem of very serious proportions which, in the case of the poorer elements of the urban population, may approach the dimensions of starvation. Sweden is in no position to continue her earlier generous help. Germany will probably make a real effort for a time to supply Finland in the hope

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1/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #190 (March 10, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. Telegram #211 (February 5, 1942) Johnson, Stockholm. Secret.

of keeping her in the war; whether this effort will be successful will depend on the general food situation in German-dominated Europe and on the availability of sufficient transport.

In spite of the wealth of firewood in the extensive forests which cover 73 per cent of Finland, Finnish cities are confronted with a serious fuel shortage, which in the severe northern winter causes great hardship. In part this is due to a shortage of labor for cutting and loading the wood, but in much greater measure it is due to transport deficiencies. According to the Quarterly Economic Report, referred to earlier, the entire requirements for the present winter were actually felled, but early in the autumn the stocks in the centers of consumption represented only a small part of the winter requirements (in Helsinki about 18 percent). 1/

In normal times, cities like Helsinki and Abo use imported coal or coke to meet a considerable part of their fuel needs--especially for public buildings, apartment houses, offices, etc. Up to early November, the Ministry of Supply had allowed the distribution of coke to centrally-heated houses in Helsinki in quantities equal to only 20

1/ Quarterly Economic Report - Finland, 29.

per cent of normal requirements. Germany contracted to deliver 125,000 tons of coke, but it is doubtful that more than a small portion has reached Finland to date. 1/ To provide sufficient wood fuel to make up for this coke shortage in a town the size of Helsinki would be almost impossible, even in normal times, to say nothing of the difficulty of using wood in heating appliances built for other fuels; but with motor transport largely commandeered by the military and the railways overstrained by military requirements, the delivery of adequate supplies of firewood to the city is out of the question. In this connection it is significant that when a representative of the Ministry of Supply told a meeting of complaining householders that they would have to get used to room temperatures of 15 degrees Centigrade (59 degrees F.), there was so much protest that the Ministry had to disown the statement.2/

However, these measures appear to have been unsuccessful, judging from a telegram from the American Legation early in February which reported that the average temperature in laborers' homes in January was about 45 degrees F. Such low house temperatures, together with the food shortage and long working hours, are not helpful in maintaining good morale.

1/ Ibid., p. 31.

2/ Ibid., p. 30. At the time this report was completed the Ministry had proposed to arrange special trains to transport to the towns the timber stored along the railways and indicated that an attempt would be made to borrow 1,000 motor trucks from Sweden for timber transport.

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IV. TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES

Shortage of transport is a recurring theme in the reports on conditions in Finland that reach this office. The length of the front, the lack of local provisions in most of the front-line area (especially in East Karelia and Lapland), the necessity for the frequent replacement of German troops serving in the far north with fresh troops from Germany (involving rail and road transport over the entire length of Finland from Abo and Hango in the southwest to Petsamo on the Arctic Ocean), and the distribution of munitions from Germany—all these factors have placed an extraordinary burden on internal transport.

As regards the railways, the chief handicap has been the shortage of rolling stock. In proportion to the mileage of its rail system, Finland was not too well provided with cars and locomotives previous to the Winter War. The loss of material in the Winter War, and the use of Finnish rolling stock in the area captured from Russia during the present war have spread the available rolling stock still more thinly over the rail system. During the summer and autumn of 1941 an additional strain was placed on the railways by the necessity for providing rail transport to Helsinki and other towns on the Gulf of Finland for freight that normally reaches these towns by boat.

To meet the shortage of cars, rolling stock has been imported from the wide-gauge railways of Estonia and Latvia. On December 2, the American Legation in Helsinki learned from a "reliable informant" that a total of 1700 tank and freight cars had been ferried over by the Germans from Estonia, for use on Finnish railways. 1/ The Finnish State Railways at that time were reported to expect at least 6,000 Estonian and Latvian cars, to meet the existing military requirements on the Finnish railways and to offset rolling stock-losses in the Winter War. 2/ A subsequent Legation telegram reports the purchase of 500 cars by the Finnish military agent in Riga in addition to the rolling stock previously brought to Finland for the German forces. 3/ No information is at present available to indicate to what degree the importation of rolling stock has ameliorated the railway transport situation.

Motor truck transport has been especially hard hit, as most trucks have been requisitioned for the army. Such trucks as the army has not taken over are quite insufficient

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1/ The shortage of tank cars has been especially acute due to the necessity for holding numbers of them on sidings in East Karelia for oil storage on account of the lack of fixed storage tanks. Tank cars so employed are retained on an average of two months before being returned to Abo where oil is unloaded from tank ships. (Telegram #611 (November 27, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.)

2/ Telegram #629 (December 2, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #716 (December 29, 1941) from Schoenfeld,Helsinki. Secret.

to cope even with essential civilian traffic. In spite of decrees requiring two drivers for each privately operated truck in order to obtain 24-hour utilization, and in spite of pleas for the utilization to full capacity all other means of transport such as cycles, hand carts, horse drawn carts and the like, the situation continues to be critical, as has already been indicated in the section on supplies. 1/ In addition to shortage of gasoline, motor transport is also handicapped, according to an officer of the Finnish General Staff, by the lack of replacements for worn-out parts. 2/ In this connection, it should be remembered that practically all of Finland's motor cars and trucks are of American manufacture; hence reserves of spare parts can no longer be replenished.

V. CASUALTIES.

According to cable dispatches from the American Legation at Helsinki, the Finnish army had suffered between 25,000 and 30,000 combatant deaths up to the end of November,

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1/ *Ibid*., p. 44.

2/ Telegram #145 (February 24, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

a figure approximating the losses of the Winter War. 1/ It is unlikely that any additional heavy losses have been suffered since that date, inasmuch as military activities have been largely stalemated.

One of the three telegrams cited above estimates the number of wounded at 60,000, but does not distinguish between seriously and lightly wounded. 2/ However, according to information subsequently furnished to the American Legation by the Finnish Red Cross, 6,000 of those wounded were permanently crippled (about the same as the total for the Winter War). 3/

No data are available as to combatant losses through capture; however, in view of the fact that the Finns were advancing during the active period of the war, these losses have probably been light.

A figure of 25,000 - 30,000 killed and twice that number wounded may seem almost miniscule when compared to the staggering losses suffered by both sides on the Russo-German front;

1/ Telegrams #637 (December 3, 1941), #688 (December 15, 1941), and #707 (December 23, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. The lower figure was given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Telegram #707), the higher by the French Military Attaché (Telegram #637). An estimate of 58,000 deaths since the beginning of the Winter War is given by the Swiss, Norwegian and "other ministers" in Helsinki (Telegram #688). This is somewhat higher than the figure of 50,000 killed in both wars given by the Foreign Minister (Telegram #707).

2/ Telegram #637 (December 3, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. Source: French Military Attaché.

3/ Telegram #46 (January 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

but in relation to the number of troops mobilized (possibly 400,000), the Finnish losses have probably been proportionately as heavy as the German. When compared to the total male population of military age, the Finnish losses may have been even heavier than the German.

According to one Finnish officer, 17-18 year old boys were being sent to the front in February.[1/] This suggests that casualties have been extremely heavy.

Such heavy losses are bound to affect the morale of the Finnish army and people, especially when one considers that hardly two years ago they suffered similar losses. In a dispatch previously referred to, the troops are reported to have been war-weary and their morale very bad as early as the first of December. 2/

VI. EVIDENCES OF WAR WEARINESS.

As long as the Finnish people believed that the war would soon be over, with their arch enemy Russia beaten to her knees and unable to threaten the independence of Finland for many years, the heavy casualties and the severe food and fuel shortages were probably generally regarded as the necessary price to be paid for ultimate security; a **hich** price to be sure, but one that would buy something of great

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1/ Telegram #140 (February 21, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #637 (December 3, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. Source: French Military Attache.

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value. But with the stalling of the German offensive and the assumption of the offensive by the Red armies, and above all, with the entrance of the United States into the war on the side of Russia, there began to be doubts as to whether Russia would be defeated after all. And without the conviction of ultimate victory, the crushing burdens of the war began to seem to many to be unbearable.

The excellent and informative fortnightly summaries of public opinion cabled by American Minister Schoenfeld in Helsinki reveal a steady increase of war-weariness during the last two months. In his summary of public opinion for the period December 7-21, 1941, he reported that the attitude of the political parties showed, generally speaking, a mixture of apathy and anxiety, with the Social Democrats becoming restless. 1/ On January 8, Schoenfeld reported that in spite of the exhortations to steadfastness by the Speaker of the Diet and General Mannerheim on New Year's Day, the people were becoming increasingly averse to the latter's chauvinism, and, with the troops, saw no reason for keeping far away in Russian Karelia the men so sorely needed at home. The American Minister indicated that the Social Democrats were becoming increasingly critical, while

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1/ Telegram #711 (December 24, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

the Central Federation of Finnish Trade Unions had memorialized the Premier to the effect that if hostilities were not stopped, all conditions would get worse; at the same time the Federation had asked that the inequality in the distribution of foodstuffs be remedied. The Minister was able to note also that differences between the Conservatives and the Socialists appeared to be more acute--so much so that some people even anticipated an open rift in the coalition government. 1/

Two weeks later, our Minister reported considerable confusion in the public mind as to just what Finland was fighting for, and a realization that the war with Russia was no longer a local struggle--as had been believed earlier--but merely one campaign in a World War. The Minister also reported that he had conclusive proof of instances of mass desertion and mutiny in the army at the front. 2/

In the next fortnightly summary of public opinion (January 21-February 1), a widening chasm between official and public attitudes was noted, with many people demanding peace immediately at any price. A growing ferment among the Social Democrats was observed and living conditions had become so extremely bad that the man in the street felt he

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1/ Telegram # 15 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram # 67 (January 24, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

had to endure much hardship with no recompense. 1/

In the survey for the period February 2-16, an increasing indifference toward the army was noted and desertions were reported so common that it was necessary for the government to initiate legislation making the punishment for that offense less severe. 2/ Disillusionment regarding East Karelia--the redemption of which was widely supported earlier in the war--has spread as it has become clear that the East Karelians, instead of being romantic heroes out of the Kalevala, are after all just "plain muzhiks," who not only fail to welcome the liberating Finns, but strike back at them with a forest cunning equal to that of the Finns themselves. However, Sir Stafford Cripps' unfortunate speech at Bristol on February 8, promising that in the event of a Russian victory Eastern Europe would be dominated by the Soviets, coupled with Ryti's warning to the Diet of February 3, probably convinced the average Finn that there was nothing else to do but to "push wearily and gloomily along the route laid out for him by his government in response to the behest of Germany." The only alternative appeared to be conquest

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1/ Telegram #98 (February 5, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ In a subsequent telegram (#209, March 13, 1942) Schoenfeld reported that 900 deserters were detained at Sukeva and 800 more near Helsinki.

by the hated Russians and exile to Siberia. 1/

Two very significant incidents indicating marked war weariness in Finland are reported in recent telegrams from the American Legation in Helsinki. One has to do with a speech given by Tanner at Abo, press reports of which were censored, although not before an account of the speech had been released by a provincial paper in the north. In this talk, Tanner is reported to have said that there had been no military activity for a whole calendar quarter and that none need be anticipated. The uncensored paper reached the front and caused wild rejoicing--the troops jumped to the conclusion that hostilities had ceased. 2/ The other incident is equally significant, at least insofar as concerns any action that may be contemplated by the United States. Apparently under the instructions of higher authority, possibly even of Mannerheim himself, Lt. Col. Sloor, the Assistant G-2 from Finnish GHQ at Mikkeli, invited our Military Attaché,

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1/ Telegram #136 (February 20, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. Regarding the East Karelians, a telegram (#140, February 21, 1942), reporting a conversation with Captain Toivola (son of the Counsellor of the Finnish Legation in Washington and recently returned from the Hiestinki front), states that the East Karelians, instead of being the noble Finns of the epic yearning to be free of the Russian yoke, are the toughest enemies the Finns have encountered. Speaking Finnish, and as redoubtable forest fighters as the Finns themselves, they often operate as guerillas deep in the Finnish rear; on one occasion, using forged documents, they even succeeded in getting off with everything in a Finnish supply depot.

2/ Telegram #140 (February 21, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

Col. Huthsteiner, to tea and expressed concern over the effect on Sweden of an Allied attack through Norway. He was convinced that such a move would result in German counter-moves through Sweden, and in Sweden's involvement in the war to the great embarrassment of Finland. Col. Sloor, showing signs of great fatigue and anxiety, said that Finland "must absolutely conclude its part in the war this year." 1/ This may suggest that if the Finnish High Command is convinced that Russia cannot be defeated, it will seize any reasonable opportunity to get out of the war.

VII. INFLUENCE OF SWEDEN.

Sweden exercises a peculiarly potent influence on Finnish foreign policy. Aside from the close cultural ties deriving from their common history until 1809 and the fact that Swedish is one of the two official languages of Finland and is spoken by most educated Finns, the two countries have somewhat the same geopolitical problems. Both countries fear and distrust Russia--although Finland, being nearer and having actually experienced Russian rule, has a more profound hatred and distrust for Moscow and for that reason is now less suspicious of Germany, Russia's enemy--and both naturally gravitate to the Western democracies.

1/ Telegram #143 (February 24, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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It might be said that where Russia is concerned, the two countries have had a common policy.

Although Sweden did not join Finland in the Winter War, her support for Finland was unmistakable and substantial. Not only did Sweden provide Finland with foodstuffs from her limited resources, but she virtually stripped her arsenals to provide war material for the Finnish army and encouraged Swedes to volunteer in the Finnish army. Even though some Finns may complain that Sweden left Finland to face the Russian giant alone, they realize that without Sweden's generous help, Finland would have suffered the same fate as the three small Baltic states. In the present war Sweden has confined her aid to foodstuffs, medical supplies and humanitarian aid of all kinds, armaments having been supplied in abundance by Germany. It is clear that Sweden thus has a large investment in Finland and a certain right to give advice to that unfortunate country. The Finns, on the other hand, while individuals and certain newspapers may criticize Sweden, realize by and large that they are dependent on Swedish support and are thus sensitive to Swedish views.

So long as Finland's apparent war aims were merely resistance to the Soviet attack of June 25 and the recapture of the territories taken by Russia under the Treaty

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of Moscow, Swedish opinion was solidly behind the Finns even though ~~they~~ many Swedes were somewhat apprehensive over the advance of Germany on their eastern flank. But when Mannerheim indicated that Finland's goal was the conquest of East Karelia, a division of opinion became apparent.

The press in general has continued to support Finland, but several newspapers have expressed doubts as to the wisdom of Finland's undertaking this somewhat ambitious enterprise. On January 3, 1942, the conservative Svenska Dagbladet held that Finland made a mistake in seeking to extend its boundaries into East Karelia. Nordens Frihet, a democratic weekly, urged the Swedish government to intervene in Helsinki since "Sweden is now the only power having diplomatic possibilities to intervene in Finland's favor." It also charged the Swedish press with misleading Finland as to the real dangers of its position by too much unreserved support for whatever Finland did. 1/ The Social Demokraten on January 30 praised the editorial in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti mentioned earlier which called for early end to the war.

During February criticism of Finland's policy became more frequent and outspoken in some newspapers although the majority continued to give whole-hearted support. Nordens

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1/ Telephoned dispatch to New York Times from Stockholm, January 5, 1942.

Frihet (on the 5th), commenting on Ryti's speech in the Finnish legislature on the 3rd pointed out that Ryti saw only one danger to the North, whereas Sweden, with the example of Norway so close, could not thus simplify the problem, adding that it was a false notion that Sweden could obtain security against Russia by accepting German supremacy. It reminded its readers that the frightful Winter War was one of the results of the German-Russian pact of 1939. The Socialist Arbetaren said bluntly (on the 6th) that Ryti's remarks against Russian aggression applied equally to Germany. Sarcastically expressing wonder that Ryti should want Sweden for an ally when he has the Germans (unless Sweden was to pick Finland's chestnuts out of the fire), the editor flatly charged him with wanting Sweden to fight for Finnish ideas of conquest--ideas which Finland was unwilling to abandon when Britain was willing to mediate. The editorial concluded with proletarian candor that Ryti's invitation to enter the war on the side of Finland and Germany must be declined because Sweden was not available for executing "Finnish bourgeois plans of conquest." The Eskilstuna Kuriren (liberal), while praising Ryti's defense of internal freedom, urged that strongest possible connections with the great democracies are a life and death matter for Finland as well as for the rest of the North. It also reminded Finland that it was Germany that sold her out to Russia two years earlier.

On the return of the Swedish journalists who made a tour in Finland as guests of the Finnish government, several leading articles and editorials on Finland appeared in the Swedish press. Most of them were laudatory; the chief editor of Stockholms Tidningen ~~(strongly religious)~~ even went so far on February 9 as to scold those Swedish papers which had suggested that Finland was pursuing an aggressive policy beyond her strength and demanding that every Swede admire the Finns and gratefully recognize that Finland was fighting for the security of the whole North and hence deserved Sweden's utmost help. But Dagens Nyheter (leading Swedish Liberal newspaper) on the same day, after noting that many Finns considered the East Karelian program too ambitious for a small state and expressing doubt that even a successful summer campaign could solve the future of Karelia, went on to say frankly that Sweden's strong interest in Finland warranted Finnish consideration for Swedish views. The writer of the editorial explained with some restraint that the East Karelian problem was extremely delicate and difficult and that Swedish public opinion was far from convinced that Finland's security was strengthened by the present Karelian objective. He warned the Finns that their friends were fearful that an attempted conquest of East Karelia might entail serious consequences.

Continuing on this note the following day (February 10), Dagens Nyheter advised the Finns that their official propaganda designed to create support for the East Karelian program was unlikely to find foreign favor except German, and charged that the latest Finnish Foreign Office pamphlet justifying inclusion of East Karelia was obviously directed toward Germany and constituted a severe verdict on past Swedish-Finnish cooperation. The writer expressed the belief that the expansionist Finns were over-simplifying the Karelian problem, forgetting that because of the allies' interest in the maintenance of the Murmansk supply route, the region was one of international concern. Warning Finland that since Swedish public opinion connects Finnish aspirations concerning East Karelia with deeper involvement in the war between the great powers, a consequent decrease of Swedish understanding of Finland's struggle as one for freedom and peace must result.

This trend toward criticism of Finland's war policy was upset by Sir Stafford Cripps' unfortunate speech at Bristol on February 8. With one accord the Swedish press expressed renewed suspicion of Russia.

Dagens Nyheter was especially bitter. It concluded its sarcastic editorial of February 11 with a warning that if England desires to give the small Baltic states the definite feeling she is indifferent to their fate, there is no better propagandist than Cripps. The influential Social Democratic Folket of Eskilstuna warned that it would be impossible to create understanding in Sweden for a British policy that bargained the territory of the Baltic States to satisfy Russia. While admitting the existence of different opinions in Sweden regarding the Finnish-Russian war, it emphasized that all Sweden was united in the demand for revision of the unjust Moscow peace to conform at least with the 1939 borders. Stockholms Tidningen, with considerable heat, accused some editors of reducing Swedish understanding for Finland's cause by their concern regarding Finnish expansion. Sensing the trend, the writer boldly assumed that the majority in Sweden wished Finland all she could obtain from her "costly contribution to the security of the whole North."

The Socialist Ostgoten asked if Cripps has joined the German propaganda service since his prophesy regarding the future position of Russia fits completely the bogey picture which the Nazis have painted. It went on to say that while the Germans are unable to destroy Scandinavian goodwill toward the Anglo-Saxon nations, the British themselves are able to destroy it by circulating false reports about conditions in German-occupied countries and misleading broadcasts about conditions in Finland, and by their far too ardent Bolshevik flirtation. 1/

The clamor in the Swedish press occasioned by Cripps' speech and his subsequent appointment to the reconstituted British War Cabinet was still in full cry on February 26, with Dagens Nyheter, possibly somewhat regretting its earlier criticism of Finnish policy, explaining that Swedish and Finnish views coincide, insofar as neither dares trust "assurances of the Soviet's kindheartedness given by her grateful, optimistic allies." Nya Dagligt Allehanda, in a review of Prof. Anton Karlgren's essay on Stalin and the Russian regime, described Stalin as "a menace to humanity who strikes chiefly against those who some day opposed him and thus plans a dreadful revenge on Finland." And concluding on an even grimmer note, it warned that he hasn't forgotten those aiding Finland.

It is perhaps too much to say that one careless speech in England could result in Swedish opinion becoming united in support of Finnish war aims. After the burst of resentment caused by Cripps' incautious prognostications has subsided, it seems likely that characteristic Swedish realism will reassert itself and pressure on Finland to restrict its ambitions once more will be resumed. Nevertheless, it will take more than Stalin's calm and reasoned order of the day to the Red Army on the anniversary of its formation, February 23, to convince the Swedes that they

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Telegram #276 (February 14, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Plain.

can rely with safety on the United Nations.

There seems to be no doubt [illegible] that the Swedes, who generally speaking hold that Finland's present war is a "local" war that is separate from the larger war, would be happy to see their neighbor across the Gulf of Bothnia once more at peace. But while Sweden would welcome an end of the Russo-Finnish war, it is the boundaries of 1939 that seemingly are considered necessary both for Finland and the North. Yet Sweden cannot now be expected to take a lead in mediating between the two contestants; to do so would arouse German animosity, and Sweden will not risk giving Germany additional excuse for increasing its pressure. Berlin's general objectives in the North are such that great caution must constantly be observed. 1/

1/ Telegram #310 (February 19, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Secret. This view was expressed to Schoenfeld by Westman, the Swedish Minister to Helsinki, who felt that any suggestion by him to Witting would be passed on to Berlin with disagreeable consequences for Sweden (#129, February 17, 1942, from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret). Cf. telegram from Schoenfeld, #684 (December 15, 1941).

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VIII. INFLUENCE OF GERMANY.

Germany's primary interest in Finland is to keep her in the war against Russia as long as possible, if not as an active ally, then at least as a passive one whose territory is available to the Germans for operations against Russia. The military advantages to Germany of bases from which to attack both the sea and the land portions of the Northern Supply Route to Russia grow in proportion as the flow of supplies over that route from Britain and America increases. It is thus clear that Germany will continue her efforts, thus far successful, to keep Finland in the war.

In making an estimate as to the likelihood that Germany will continue to be successful in these efforts, it is necessary to analyze the political, economic and military pressure which Germany has brought to bear on Finland to date and to appraise its chances of continued success in the light of Finnish interests and attitudes.

Whatever the momentary views of individuals and parties in Finland have been toward Germany, the geopolitical situation of Finland has compelled its government to regard Germany--whether Hohenzollern, Republican or Hitlerite--as a counterweight to Russia, and the Finnish public has by and large acquiesced--if not always enthusiastically--in this view. Russia has ever been the nearby, immediate menace, while Germany, whatever her record in the threatment of other small nations, has not directly threatened Finland, and has repeatedly been the rival of Russia in the Baltic region from the days of Novgorod to the present. If one bears this in mind it is possible to understand how a free democracy like Finland with a parliament dominated by socialists, small farmers and Liberals can be associated with a power whose government is the antithesis of every political and social ideal that these groups cherish. To the average Finn, the menace of Russia is so immediate and so much more potent than that of Germany that he forgets that before the present war with Russia, it was widely believed that Germany "allowed" Russia to attack Finland in 1939, and that many even believed that Germany was an active participant on the side of Russia during the Winter War. 1/

The essential contradiction in Finnish aspirations is graphically expressed in two letters from Finnish women to friends in the New World written soon after the outbreak of the present war. "A free Finland forever," writes one, and follows this pledge of faith immediately with the confession: "For the first time in my life I said today 'Heil Hitler,' for our help comes from him." 2/ The other letter

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1/ Information from John H. Wuorinen, January, 1942.

2/ Letter from Wera Kurri, Rafso, Finland, to Helga Hasselblatt, Buenos Aires, June 30, 1941 (original in Swedish). British Censorship Intercept Tri. 17388, C.O.I. Accession No. 7776.

is more explicit: "Now we have only one wish and that is, that Germany should win. Everyone is very much amazed at England's attitude. We have always kept her as our ideal; we could have understood her if she had made peace with Germany, rather than side with Russia." 1/

Although the Finns have been fighting jointly with Germany against a common enemy, and although German troops have been and still are based on Finnish soil, Finnish leaders deny strenuously that they are allied with Germany in a political sense. As recently as the middle of March, Witting assured the American Minister that Finland was not allied with Germany, but was merely a "co-belligerent." He denied "with great stress" that a new agreement on political matters was in the offing and even insisted that no pressure for any such arrangement had been exerted by the Nazis. 2/ However, a week earlier the Finnish Minister in Stockholm, Wasastjerna, had told our Minister there that the chief aim of his government at that time was to sidestep Nazi pressure for a Finnish-German agreement, an event which in his opinion might well be unavoidable. 3/ This seeming contradiction may be explained in several ways. It is possible that Wasastjerna, who on several occasions has expressed

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1/ Letter from Lyyli Granbohm, Helsinki, to Rouva Saima Ikola, Ishpeming, Michigan, July 16, 1941 (original in Finnish). British Censorship Intercept Ber. 43081, C.O.I. Accession No. 7778.

2/ Telegram #224 (March 17, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #472 (March 9, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Secret.

his apprehensions regarding Germany, is inclined to interpret German requests for agreement on specific points as German pressure for a general political alliance, while Witting, who inclines to be somewhat pro-German, would not be so likely to view requests, which to him probably seem normal, as pressure for such an alliance. On the other hand, it is possible that either Witting or Wasastjerna is somewhat less than truthful. There is no evidence available here to indicate that the latter is not entirely sincere, while we have some evidence to indicate that Witting has not invariably been frank. In any case, a definite political agreement between Finland and Germany would seem to have such advantages for the latter, that it appears that pressure has in fact been exerted on Finland for the conclusion of a political alliance.

Finland's signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact is not necessarily to be taken as evidence of a definite tie to Germany in furtherance of a common political policy. As will be shown subsequently, Finland was compelled to adhere to the Pact by the threat that failure to do so would deprive her of some 75,000 tons of grain which Germany had provided earlier. Furthermore, unless the Pact, as signed by Finland, includes secret clauses, it represents no change in political outlook, since the declared opposition to

Communism which is the essence of the Pact is no innovation for Finland. The reluctance of the Finnish Government to subscribe formally to this instrument, and the failure of the Government to submit it to the Diet, were in all probability due to apprehension that the signing of the pact would arouse suspicions in England and America--especially the latter.

Finland has not yet, so far as is known, subscribed to or agreed to subscribe to the Tripartite or "Axis" Pact. Should German economic pressure be successful in compelling Finland's adherence to this pact, the political influence of Germany would thereby be greatly strengthened. However, present indications are that Finland will continue to resist pressure to join the Axis.

A special kind of political influence is that which is or may be exercised by the Gestapo. A report from a reliable British source indicates that as early as last November, agents of the German secret police were well placed in Finland. According to this source, they were installed in all the State enterprises and even in the offices of the various ministries; the Finnish police were alleged to be "in the hands of the Gestapo." While this report of Gestapo penetration may be exaggerated, the increasing influence of the Gestapo is reported in a telegram from the American Legation, Helsinki, which states that the Gestapo had placed at least five of its own men in the Finnish secret police and was increasing its control over that organization. 1/ Another telegram of the same date reported that a high Gestapo official had recently visited Helsinki to discuss men engaged in secret police work with the appropriate Finnish authorities. 2/ Operations of the Gestapo in Finland should be facilitated by the presence of members of the Nazi signal corps in telephone exchanges. According to a report of January 18, fifty Nazis were stationed in the central telephone exchange of Helsinki. 3/

Germany's military influence on Finland is compounded of several factors. Most important of these is her ability to hold the major part of Russia's forces away from the Finnish front. During the summer and fall when the German armies were advancing rapidly and the capture of Moscow and Leningrad seemed to be assured, German military prestige was very high in Finland. The Finns counted especially on Germany's capturing Leningrad--its seizure, they felt, would end the war as far as Finland was concerned. According to a report of mid-December from a reputedly reliable source, it was believed in Finland that the Germans would do the

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1/ Telegram #217 (March 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. The source of this information was a member of the former Estonian government.

2/ Telegram #220 (March 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. Source of information not the same as in the preceding telegram, although regarded as dependable.

3/ Telegram #50 (January 18, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

real fighting, that the Finnish soldiers would be held in the second line and that after the retreat of the Russians (which was expected almost immediately) they would merely have to hold the new frontier. According to this source, the original plan, as drawn up by the German and Finnish General Staffs, contemplated a rapid German attack in the far north with a subsequent advance down the Murmansk railway which would force the Russians to withdraw from Karelia. The German failure to reach the northern part of the railway (which, they explained, was due to the impossibility of operating with tanks, and to the delays caused by swampy ground and wooded terrain) made it necessary for the Finns to do most of the fighting themselves, with consequent heavy losses. This resulted, according to the source quoted, in many Finns saying, in effect, that they had been tricked into the war by false pretences on the part of the Germans. The Finns were also disappointed by the failure of the Germans to cut off the Russian sea and air communications to Hango. 1/

Early in December there were expressions of disappointment over the German failure to take Russia's second largest city, and of apprehension that Finland would now have to undertake a spring campaign. 2/ During the past winter German

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1/ "Q". C.O.I. Accession No. 11384.

2/ Telegram #668 (December 10, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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set-backs in Russia and the sorry performance of the German troops in Finland have considerably deflated the military reputation of Germany. Insofar as public opinion in Finland is concerned, the poor record of the German soldiers in Finland is the more important, since government control of the press has made it possible to minimize the magnitude and significance of the German reverses in Russia.1/ But it has not been possible to conceal the shortcomings of the German soldiers on the Finnish front; the stories of Finnish soldiers home on leave spread rapidly and the miserable appearance of the German soldiers has unfavorably impressed all who saw them.

The failure of German support at critical times on the front has created a very unfavorable impression. The fate of the crack Finnish Salla Regiment has evoked especially bitter feelings. During the fighting around Kiestinki last summer the regiment lost "several battalions" because the Nazis failed to support them. After recuperating at Tornio, two of the surviving battalions were sent back to Kiestinki in the fall to strengthen von Falkenhorst's German forces, and were wiped out; two other battalions, also under German orders, were sent to the North where they were practically

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1/ In spite of the press censorship, doubts about a German victory were on the increase in January, according to the American Legation's survey of public opinion for the two weeks ending on February 2 (telegram #98 [February 5, 1942] from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret).

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annihilated. As a result the Salla district has almost no able-bodied men left. 1/

In comparison with the Finnish defensive battles in the Winter War against stronger Russian forces and their summer and early fall drive east of Lake Ladoga in the present war, the performance of the German divisions has been notably inferior. Their offensives toward Kandalaksha and Murmansk last fall came to nothing. According to the military attaché of a neutral power, the Germans alone are unable to capture Sorokka (Belomorsk). 2/ The Finns have grown to have so little confidence in the military prowess of the German forces in Finland that they had the German 163d Division sent to the rear from the Svir river front, preferring to carry on alone, rather than to be distracted by the necessity of backing up the Germans. 3/

The prestige of the German army has also suffered from the pitifully inadequate winter clothing of the German soldiers. An army can hardly expect to retain the respect of the people among whom it is quartered when its soldiers will barter almost anything for warm clothing. In January it was

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1/ Telegram #7 (January 3, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. This is confirmed by an observer recently returned from Finland.

2/ Telegram # 106 (February 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #114 (February 12, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

reported that newly arrived German soldiers would exchange their rations of tobacco, rum and even food to obtain warm garments; typical barter rates were five cans of pork for one woolen sweater and two bottles of rum for a sheepskin cap. 1/ The same report contains the testimony of a Finnish doctor in regard to frostbite among the German soldiers. According to this source, four-fifths of a group of German casualties in the north were cases of frostbitten feet due to the hobnails and large steel plates on the soles of the shoes which acted as conductors for the severe cold; the soldiers were so well-disciplined that they did not dare to remove the steel from their footwear.2/

The change in the attitude toward the German army since last summer is well summed up in a report of January 1, which states that the former pro-German feeling of the Finnish Army had "largely disappeared" due to disgust at the "floundering" of the Germans and the increasing discrepancy between German boasts and German accomplishments.3/ It is reported from an excellent source who had unusual opportunities for observation in Finland, that this feeling is even shared by Mannerheim and his staff.[illegible] However, if the Germans are able to mount a new offensive against Russia

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1/ Telegram #53 (January 19, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki, Secret.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Telegram #723 (January 1, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

during the coming months, their poor showing during the winter will be overlooked. But should they fail to score a decisive success against the Russians, it must inevitably cause even the remaining pro-German elements to lose all faith in Germany's military power. The Finns are centering their hopes on a successful Nazi spring offensive, realizing that if it fails to destroy Russia their future prospects are grim indeed. 1/

In estimating the extent of German military influence on Finland, the possibility of direct military pressure cannot be entirely discarded, although the record of the German forces in Finland to date does not suggest that this kind of pressure would be very effective. At the present time the actual military effectives of Germany in Finland probably do not exceed 10 divisions, while the present mobilized strength of the Finnish army is not less than 14 divisions. Furthermore, six of the German divisions are in the far north where they are in no position to bring pressure to bear quickly on the principal Finnish centers; moreover the lengthy supply lines of these forces through Finland would make them extremely vulnerable should Finnish

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1/ Telegram #171 (March 4, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. (Survey of public opinion, February 16-March 2) In this connection it should be mentioned that Mannerheim himself is of the opinion that the success of a Nazi spring offensive is anything but assured. (Telegram #61 [January 21, 1942] from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.)

resistance to German pressure lead to actual hostilities. On the other hand, Germany could doubtless hold Abo and Hango, her principal bases in Finland at present, and possibly also some of the smaller ports on the Gulf of Bothnia. From these bases and also from her bases in Estonia, Germany could bomb all the chief Finnish centers. She could also land additional forces in Finland. However, it seems extremely unlikely that Germany would exert such pressure as would lead to open hostilities with the Finns. Aside from the obvious psychological disadvantages (effect on public opinion in Germany as well as in the neutral countries and the United Nations), the military risks would be considerable. Not only would Finland probably make peace with Russia, thus freeing Russian forces to fight the Germans elsewhere, but Germany would almost surely lose her position in the far north. Furthermore, Finnish bases would be available to United Nations forces for striking at the German positions in the Baltic States and the iron ore route through the Gulf of Bothnia from Lulea in Sweden. Under the circumstances, direct military pressure would appear to be ruled out as a means whereby Germany may exert military influence on Finland. 1/

1/ According to a dispatch telephoned from Stockholm to the New York Times of January 11, observers in the Swedish capital were of the opinion that if "worst came to worst," German troops in Finland would not "constitute a very difficult problem for Mannerheim."

Economic pressure is by far Germany's most powerful weapon for influencing Finland's policies. As indicated in the section of this memorandum dealing with food supplies, Finland's dependence on Germany has increased as the war has been prolonged. In February of this year Witting admitted to Schoenfeld that Finland depended on the good will of Germany for 93 per cent of its imports. He even went so far as to compare Finland's position to that of a trapped mouse and to admit that Finland's position vis-a-vis Germany was somewhat similar to her position as a Grand Duchy under the Tsar. 1/ The truth of this remarkable admission is born out by the record.

Germany's economic stranglehold on Finland is such that she can threaten that unfortunate country with actual starvation. It is indeed a sad commentary on the developments of the last three years that the nation which proudly rejected Germany's offer of a non-aggression pact in the spring of 1939 and fought courageously and alone against a nation 40 times larger in defense of her territorial integrity six months later, should he find it necessary in the fall of 1941 to join the German Anti-Comintern Pact, knowing full well that that compact was directed as much against the democracies as against Russia, in order to obtain a

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1/ Telegram #94 (February 4, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

mere 75,000 tons of rye grain. It was not merely a case of the Finnish government agreeing to become a signatory of the pact subject to the approval of the Diet: Germany demanded adherence by a specific date, to wit, the 5th anniversary of the original accord, on the pain of withholding the promised grain. Even though Witting assured the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Diet that adherence to the pact would only recognize in words what was already a fact and even though Ramsay, the Associate Minister of Supply assured the public that Germany's action in supplying food supplies "does not denote profit-making or self interest, but was an act of friendship," neither Witting nor Ramsay could deny that Germany had presented a pistol at Finland.1/ However, Uusi Suomi, which has supported the Government's leaning toward Germany, threw some doubt on Germany's altruism in its issue of January 22, by admitting that Germany would not have the same interest in helping Finland if Finland were neutral. 2/

If Germany were in a position to provide Finland with all or even a substantial part of the food Finland must import, it is likely that she could keep Finland in the war

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1/ Telegrams #603 (November 22, 1941) and #25 (January 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #64 (January 22, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Plain.

as an active combatant. However, as indicated previously, it is unlikely that Germany can deliver such amounts. The delivery of 9000 tons of potatoes to Helsinki in a frozen, and therefore worthless condition, was unlikely to give the people of that city much confidence in Germany's ability to deliver what she promised. While the freezing of German Baltic ports provided Germany with a good alibi for the failure to deliver the promised 75,000 tons of rye on the date specified, hungry Finns could object that the Germans had plenty of time to get the grain out before the ice formed.

Not only is Finland dependent on Germany for food, but also for coal, iron and steel, heavy manufactures, machinery and, of course, armaments. Failure to supply any of these would cripple Finland, but food is Germany's greatest economic weapon. As pointed out in the American Legation's January survey of the food situation, "Germany's ability to feed the Finns or its incapacity to do so may prove decisive in the future development both of the internal and domestic policies of this country." 1/

In spite of the yielding of the Government in the matter of the Anti-Comintern Pact, there is evidence to indicate that resistance to German pressure has increased. There is

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1/ Telegram #17 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

also indication of considerable anti-German feeling in the country.

The most conclusive evidence of resistance to German demands lies in the fact that the Finns have not yet undertaken a serious offensive toward Sorokka (Belomorsk), although the Germans have been pressing the Finns to attack this important Russian transport center. 1/ Although the Finns are astride the Murmansk Railroad in the Lake Onega region, the supplies landed at Murmansk can reach the main Russian front via the new railway which runs east from Sorokka to the Archangel Railroad. In view of the impending German offensive against the Russians, interruption of the increasing flow of British and American supplies by this route must assume major importance in the minds of the German leaders. It,. therefore, may be safely presumed that the Germans have exercised considerable pressure on the Finnish Government to undertake an offensive toward Sorokka which, if successful, would cut this route. 2/ To date the evidence available does not indicate that the Finns will undertake such an offensive. As was suggested in a previous section of this memorandum, Finnish reluctance to cut the main supply route to Russia is probably in part due to

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1/ Telegram #106 (February 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ According to a reliable British source the Germans were pressing the Finns last November to advance far enough to cut even the Archangel Railway.

their fear that such action might incur the enmity of the United States and thus jeopardize Finland's position in the event that Germany is defeated. In addition to this major political consideration, the Finns probably are unwilling, in view of their growing shortage of man-power, to undertake an offensive which would undoubtedly be very costly. In view of the great importance of Sorokka to the Russians, they would in all probability defend it strenuously. According to an hitherto reliable source in Helsinki, the Finns estimate that the capture of Sorokka would cost them 20,000 men. 1/

There is considerable evidence of growing friction between the German forces in Finland and the civilian population. A reliable British source states that the behavior of the German troops is far from good. Civilians have been attacked and robbed of their livestock which the German soldiers have slaughtered and devoured on the spot. In Helsinki, according to this source, German police have stood by while German soldiers have committed thefts in shops. Protests by the Finnish civilian authorities are reported to have been of no avail. From another source it is learned that contempt for the Germans is growing because of liberties which they have taken with the Lottas. 2/ In view of

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1/ Telegram #106 (February 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #133 (February 19, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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the high regard in which these women are held, these activities of the Germans, if properly exploited by American propaganda, could rapidly increase the friction between the German forces and the Finnish civilian population.

Some idea of the degree to which resentment toward the Germans has developed may be derived from a report of early December which states that the Finnish government refused a request from the German staff for permission to send several thousand German soldiers to Helsinki on leave on the ground that it feared disturbances between the German soldiers and demobilized Finns. 1/

Another source of indignation toward the Germans is their handling of the Finnish Jaeger Battalion which was recruited in Germany. In spite of the German promise that this volunteer unit would not fight except on Finnish soil, it was sent to the Ukrainian front where, according to one report it was wiped out; according to another, it lost half of its men, the rest being returned to Finland at the special request of Mannerheim. 2/

It seems probable that Germany's handling of Estonia

1/ Telegram #652 (December 7, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegrams #35 (January 14, 1942) and #115 (February 12, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

has contributed somewhat to Finnish resentment toward Germany. The proximity of Estonia to Finland, the racial kinship of its people to the Finns, and the common fear of the two countries regarding Russia, have promoted Finnish interest and sympathy for the small neighbor across the Gulf of Finland. From time to time during the period between the two world wars, the possibility of a union between the two countries was agitated in Finland. Consequently, the Finns welcomed the German advance in the Baltic states, assuming that once the Russians were driven out, the Germans would restore the former Estonian government,confining their interference in Estonian affairs to the military sphere. But the Germans proceeded to disappoint Finnish hopes by installing their own administration and in general treating Estonia like any other conquered territory. According to a report of mid-December from a reputedly reliable source, previously quoted, Germany's desire to convert Estonia into a German province was "very damaging" to German-Finnish relations; Finnish students and junior officers openly demanded that the Finnish Government interest itself in political developments in Estonia and in German intentions regarding Estonia. The same source stated that the Finnish Government had informed Berlin that Finland could not remain indifferent in questions concerning the future of Estonia. 1/ Finland's feeling was emphasized by the celebration of Estonian Independence Day, February 24, at Helsinki under the auspices of the Finnish League; the meeting was addressed by the former Estonian cabinet minister, Varma. 2/ That the Germans are sensitive to the Finnish attitude in regard to Estonia is indicated by the fact that the Germans permitted the celebration of Independence in Estonia, and the Reich's Commissar for Estonia even promised that Estonia would not become a German colony. However, the value of this promise may be judged from Rosenberg's decree of March 18 incorporating Estonia in German "Ostland" as a "general district." This decree largely legalized the existing setup and provides for German appointment of local officials and German retention of full juridical and economic control. 3/ Proper exploitation of this element of Finnish-German friction might well increase Finnish suspicion of Germany.

Finally there is evidence that governmental and military leaders in Finland are becoming increasingly irritated at German arrogance and the growing discrepancies between

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1/ "Q". C.O.I. Accession No. 11384. This source predicted a deterioration in Finnish-German relations in the period March-May, 1942.

2/ Telegram #151 (February 25, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Plain.

3/ Telegram #581 (March 19, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Plain. (Press reports, Stockholm, March 19, 1942)

German boasts and German achievements. It is remarked that the arrogance of the Germans increases as Finland becomes more dependent on Germany for supplies. 1/ An American recently returned from Finland reports that the attitude of the younger Finnish officers toward the Germans has been so openly contemptuous that the German high command in Finland has complained to Mannerheim.

There is reason to believe that a suspicion is growing in certain circles that Germany may leave Finland to shift for itself. Toward the end of February it was reported that some Finns feared that the coming German offensive would be in South Russia and that some Finnish military authorities were apprehensive that the Nazis would desert them and leave Finland to shift for itself. 2/ Early in March it was reported from Helsinki that people there were worried over the possibility that the Soviets and Nazis would reach an understanding (including some agreement as regards Finland) as a result of a Japanese attack on Russia. 3/

1/ Telegram #195 (March 10, 1942) from Schoenfeld. Secret. (From a close friend of Mannerheim)

2/ Telegram #143 (February 24, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. However, the Assistant G-2 at Finnish General Headquarters doubted that Germany would leave Finland to fend for itself.

3/ Telegram #185 (March 9, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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From the evidence available, it appears that Germany's military influence on Finland has declined in considerable measure since last fall and that her principal means of bringing pressure to bear on Finland is the threat of withholding food supplies. The effectiveness of this threat is in some degree, at least, offset by Germany's failure to deliver all the supplies promised at the times agreed on. Irritation toward Germany is increasing due to this and to the conduct of German soldiers in Finland. A suspicion that Germany may abandon Finland is current, at least in some circles. In general, it may be said that Germany's hold on Finland has weakened since last fall, and although it is still considerable, could be still further weakened by a properly organized propaganda campaign.

J. A. Morrison

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IX. INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

The admiration and even affection with which Finland has been regarded by the American public during the last quarter-century have been in large measure reciprocated by the Finns. Until our entry in the war on the side of Russia, they recalled with gratitude the work of the Hoover Relief Committee, they appreciated the aid provided in the Winter War, and though perhaps somewhat envious of our wealth and disappointed that we did not take greater responsibility in world affairs, most Finns regarded the United States as the chief support of the kind of world they wished to live in. As a consequence, the influence of the United States on Finnish public opinion was as great, if not greater than any other country, with the possible exception of Sweden. A tradition of friendship and understanding as deep as that which has existed between Finland and the United States is not easily wiped out, though the developments of the present world conflict have placed the United States on the side of Finland's enemy and Finland on the side of the enemies of the United States. Understanding of the situation of Finland and a well-conceived and carefully conducted campaign to exploit the traditional friendly feeling of the Finns toward America, the weaknesses of Finland's situation, and the points of friction with Germany may provide results of immediate advantage to the war-aims of the United States and, in the long run, be of benefit to Finland herself.

It is not surprising, in view of American support of Finland in the Winter War, that Finland should find it difficult to understand our criticism of her in her new war with Russia. It is not necessary here to discuss the exchange of notes between the governments of the United States and Finland, since they have been amply publicized. Attention should, however, be called to the Finnish delay in answering Secretary Hull's note of October 27; in the light of the friendly tone of the note, this delay can only be interpreted as due to considerable anxiety on the part of the Finnish leaders as to the consequences of failure to comply with the American suggestions.

The reaction of the public to the American statements was much the same in all groups irrespective of party or class. The gist of the reaction was expressed by the _Suomen Sosialidemokraatti_: "We took to arms only to defend the freedom and independence of our country, and we could not afford to refrain from defending ourselves because another state with different political ideals happened to fight on the same front." The United States not being at war with Germany, to say nothing of being allied with Russia, its security could not be weakened by Finland's action; the safety and interests of the United States do not depend on whether Finland is in the war or out of it. 1/

These and similar contentions and interpretations were not, however, considered sufficient. It was suggested that the American memoranda could hardly express general American opinion, the implication being that Washington was only echoing British desires, while the people in the United States would show understanding for the Finnish effort to secure their future existence. The State Department was trying to "intimidate" Finland; the American nation would see the situation in the right light. 2/ Incidentally, Schoenfeld reported on November 7, 1941, that all papers were angered by the alleged peace offer on August 18, both as to procedure and content. 3/

It seems clear that uneasiness and chagrin were created by our view that the Finnish-Russian war is definitely a part of the Anglo-Russian war against Germany, and by our

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1/ Telegrams #553 (November 5, 1941) and #557 (November 12, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ These views probably derived, in part, from some sections of our press, and from the statements of individuals who did not see eye to eye with the State Department at the time or noisily opposed our foreign policy before December 7, 1941.

3/ Telegrams #560 (November 6, 1941), #561 (November 7, 1941), and #567 (November 7, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret. The summaries and extracts from Finnish newspapers forwarded by the Legation in Helsinki do not fully bear out the last statement. It is therefore to be presumed that other newspaper items have been perused by the Legation.

failure to accept the Finnish interpretation of "strategic boundaries." Nevertheless, the Finns seem to have been convinced, till early December, that the United States would treat them in a friendly spirit, both now and later when peace would be made.

Pearl Harbor changed the situation in several respects. The alliance of the United States with Russia, Great Britain and other anti-Axis powers at once demolished parts of the earlier Finnish argument. Schoenfeld reported that almost savage and malicious satisfaction was felt--by whom or how widely he did not state--because President Roosevelt personally (not the people of the United States) had finally been caught in a shooting war. At least one scurrilous attack on the United States was permitted to appear, in the Kauppalehti (Commercial News), on December 12, after Germany had declared war against the United States. [1]

After Pearl Harbor, the Finns were reported (on December 24, 1941, and again on February 5, 1942) to fear that we might sever diplomatic and other relations, and that they did not think of doing so themselves. Nearly three months later (March 16, 1942) it was reported that Nazi pressure, exerted both in Berlin and in Helsinki, to force the closing of the United States Legation in the Finnish capital had been successfully resisted by the Finnish government. On the other hand, the work of the Legation was being complicated by "a definite move on foot" to place a barrier between its staff and the Finnish people by intimidating persons who bring information and in other ways. 1/ Yet Witting, the Foreign Minister, was displaying a friendlier spirit toward the United States than earlier, and was apparently "anxious" not to lose contact with the United States. 2/

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[1] Telegram #711 (December 24, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

It is clear from the foregoing that ignorance of American opinion and developments prevailed in Finland before December 7 of last year and has prevailed since. Schoenfeld's communications make it evident that real news from and about the United States have failed to reach the Finns for some time, and that consequently the public is unable to form anything like a clear picture of American policy or war effort.

The explanation is the practice, seemingly deliberate, of practically suppressing news from the United States. President Roosevelt's speeches and statements--talks to the nation over the radio, messages to Congress, etc.--are either not reported at all, or when mention is made of

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1/ Ibid., and telegrams #98 (February 5, 1942), #157 (February 27, 1942), and #218 (March 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram # 58 (January 20, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

them, distorted. This policy has been carried to the point where even well-informed Finns are unable to understand their government's attitude. This, by the way, is in contrast to the policy adopted toward Great Britain whose news--Chruchill's speeches, etc.--are reported in some detail. Axis items are printed, of course, and what American news does get printed, can be read only through an unmistakable Nazi-Jap smudge. In a word, the Germans manifestly exercise control over the Finnish press. 1/

The fact that the people are thus kept in the dark shows that even Berlin considers public opinion in Finland important enough to deserve attention. Nor is the Finnish government in a position to forget the public. Johnson reported early in January that according to the Finnish Minister in Stockholm, public opinion has a definite effect on any action that Finland might be asked to take--reference is presumably to Germany--against the United States, although it cannot always guide the foreign policy of the Republic. 2/ And some weeks later the Finnish refusal to force the closing of the United States Legation in Helsinki was based on the contention that such action would have a bad effect upon the masses of the Finnish people. 3/

1/ Telegrams #65 (January 16, 1942), #98 (February 5, 1942), and #171 (March 4, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Telegram #38 (January 9, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Secret.

3/ Telegram #218 (March 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

Their anxiety over the possible severance of diplomatic relations with the United States appears to be growing. At least wiser heads in the country fully appreciate our strength, and that appreciation probably will grow with the increase of the doubts over a German victory.

There seems to be little doubt but that the time is opportune for a deliberate, well-organized effort to influence Finnish public opinion so as to win the people over to our side and to wean the government from whatever inclination may exist in the Ministry to do the bidding of Berlin. The very fact that only news unfavorable to the United States is available to the Finns and that they listen eagerly to the BBC--and perhaps because of the availability of British news over the radio, also print a fair amount of British news in the newspapers--suggests possibilities that should not be neglected. Early in March, 1942, Schoenfeld emphasized the need for an easily heard American news broadcast service. 1/ In the light of the information concerning the one-sided and even hostile treatment of American news in the Finnish press for some time past, ample reason does exist for acting at the earliest possible moment, and with all possible energy.

The broadcasts, in order to be effective, would have to be presented in a carefully prepared idiom--the word is used

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1/ Telegram #171 (March 4, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

in its widest sense--both as to fact and interpretation. The necessary material can be readily assembled. Our gigantic war effort, the unity of our people, the determination to carry on till victory is achieved, the ultimate certainty of Axis defeat, and other equally central aspects of "America and her Allies at War" yield formidable ammunition for a radio campaign that will sustain the Finns who already see the light as we would have them see the light, and convert those who now move in the darkness of the Axis night.

In view of recent references in the public press to the possibility of an Anglo-American intervention in the far north of Scandinavia, it is pertinent to contemplate the probable reaction of the Finns to such an enterprise. The sources available to this office throw no direct light on the problem. Yet this contributor feels justified, on the basis of fairly extensive and detailed knowledge of Finland and its people, in hazarding an opinion. If the undertaking were American (or Anglo-American) and if it were preceded by an appropriate, vigorous radio campaign that would carry assurances that Finland will not be left exposed to the tender mercies of Russia, the Finns would in all likelihood not only not oppose such intervention, but would turn it to good use in getting the Germans out of the country.

This surmise rests primarily upon the strong impression and belief that security against Russia is the main concern of the Finns and that the vast majority of the Finns, despite their present association with the Germans, have no love whatever for Hitlerite Germany but consider it a danger second only to the threat from the U.S.S.R.

John H. Wuorinen

X. EVIDENCES OF DISUNITY.

While it would undoubtedly be a serious error to assume that because there has been criticism of the present government of Finland by certain Finnish newspapers and individuals, the fall of that government is therefore imminent, there is nevertheless some evidence to indicate that in the present war Finnish public opinion has somewhat less of the monolithic unity which characterized it in the Winter War. The difference between public opinion in the Winter War and the present conflict with Russia was characterized by the head of a prominent Finnish publishing house, now a major in the Finnish army, in the following terms: In the Winter War the issue was clear and was one of self-defense only, whereas in the present war the situation is very different; the public still feels that the Russian menace must be crushed (and German aid is appreciated), but there is far less agreement as to what outcome of the war would be best for Finland. According to this observer, people are inclined to be governed by earlier predilections for the Anglo-Saxon powers or for Germany and are not clear as to the advantage for Finland of an outright victory for either side. 1/

1/ Telegram #45 (January 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

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1/ Telegram #45 (January 16, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

As early as October 1st of last year there was a suggestion of lack of complete unanimity in Finland regarding the present war. On that date the American Minister received an unofficial and quite spontaneous call from Pekkala, Minister of Finland and a leading Social Democrat. At that time the question of Finland's relations to Great Britain was acute. From his conversation with Pekkala, the American Minister received the impression that in regard to Britain there was some difference of public opinion; the majority felt that Finnish policy should be guided primarily by strategical considerations, while a minority (to which Pekkala apparently belonged) favored a maximum of concession to the British point of view. Pekkala also noted a division of opinion between the political leaders and prominent business men on the one hand and the masses of the people on the other hand, with the former not averse to collaboration with the Nazis and the latter (including the majority of the Social Democrats) beginning to be affected by war weariness. 1/

By January the increasing war-weariness and food shortage had so developed that Sosialidemokraatti in its issue of January 3 was emboldened to point out (in connection with the East Karelian question) that "in Finland the problem of Lebensraum has not existed in the true sense of the word,"

1/ Telegram #469 (October 1, 1941) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

and that "the Lebensraum of the workers is freedom." Reminding the authorities that the Finnish workers had demonstrated their patriotism in fighting the Russians, the paper went on to warn that "they also know their rights." This implied criticism of the Government's policy was followed the next day by an even bolder stand, already referred to earlier in this report, declaring openly that "there are probably certain possibilities of dropping military operations." The same article, referring to the discontent among the workers caused by the shortage of food, warned that "worry about daily bread is the most dangerous stone in the path of the so-called united front." 1/ Three days later the American Minister noted that the differences between the Conservatives and the Socialists had become so acute that some people even anticipated an open rift in the coalition government. 2/ In his fortnightly summary of public opinion for January 21-February 1, Schoenfeld reported a widening chasm between official and public attitudes, with a growing ferment among the Social Democrats. 3/ It was also pointed out that living conditions had become so extremely bad that the man in the street felt he had to endure much hardship with no recompense.

1/ New York Times, January 5, 1942 (by telephone from Stockholm, January 4).

2/ Telegram #15 (January 8, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

3/ Telegram #98 (February 5, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

The increasing stringency of food supplies has apparently accentuated class differences which normally are not conspicuous in Finland. In his summary of public opinion for the period February 2-16, the American Minister noted that while the poorer elements were having to go without tobacco and were unable to obtain sufficient food, more properous people were able to supply themselves from the "black market." 1/ Discontent among the workers of the cities, especially in the ranks of the Social Democrats, apparently had become sufficiently vocal to result in attacks on them by the more conservative elements. These even accused the Social Democrats of being under the control of Communists and international Jews. 2/ However, while there may be grumbling and discontent among the Social Democrats, it is unlikely to lead to anything more explosive so long as the veteran Tanner is in control of the party. 3/

Tanner and other leaders of the party have been confused by the action of Great Britain, which they have long regarded as a citadel of liberalism, in supporting Russia. They were especially dismayed by Sir Walter Citrine's visit to Moscow in view of his warm support of Finland during the

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1/ Telegram #136 (February 20, 1942) from Schoenfeld, Helsinki. Secret.

2/ Ibid.

3/ Ibid.

Winter War. Under the circumstances, it is not likely that the leaders of Finland's largest political party will vigorously and consistently oppose the war policies of the Government. On the other hand, it is reasonably clear that the rank and file of the Social Democrats will oppose an increase of German influence in Finland and will act as a brake on the more ambitious expansionists in the Government.

A far more serious element of disunity in the present Finnish situation is the growing tension between the farmers and the population of the larger cities. The acute food shortages described in the section of this report dealing with the supply situation have applied primarily to the larger cities. The rural population has been less affected. In part this is due to the transport difficulties, but there is some evidence to indicate that the farmers are holding back food which they normally sell on the city markets. According to information from Stockholm, the farmers are reluctant to bring produce to the towns because there is "nothing they can purchase and the prices they can get are unsatisfactory." 1/

Here we have in miniature a replica of the famous "scissors crisis" which plagued the Soviet leaders in the early 1920's. It is possible that the decree compelling

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1/ Telegram #797 (April 10, 1942) from Johnson, Stockholm. Secret.

the farmers to sell a specified quantity of potatoes per hectare (supra, p. 37) and the subsequent confiscation of seed rye and wheat (supra, pp. 37-38) represent an attempt to meet this situation at the expense of the farmers. In view of the criticism of the Government by the politically articulate city workers (who belong largely to the powerful Social Democratic Party) and the recollection of the role of these workers in the Civil War of 1918-1919, it would be logical for the authorities to placate them even at the risk of antagonizing the politically less articulate farmers. Failure to obtain adequate food supplies from Germany may conceivably lead to further requisitioning from the farmers with resulting increase of tension between the rural and urban populations. This tension might make the Government more amenable to American pressure, especially if this pressure were accompanied by guarantees of food deliveries.

While there are thus indications of some lack of united support of the present Government, the evidence available is not sufficient to warrant a positive statement that there is yet serious disunity in the country. The evidences of discontent do suggest, however, that the situation may develop to a point where it could be exploited with advantage to America's vital interests. 1/

J. A. Morrison

1/ It cannot be too greatly emphasized that, in any attempt to lessen public support of the present policies of the

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Finnish Government by radio propaganda, the greatest care would have to be exercised not to offend Finnish sensibilities. No approach should be adopted without the most painstaking consideration of its probable effect. The advice and suggestions of the American representatives in Finland, who are in the best position to know what to stress and what to avoid, should be scrupulously followed.